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ABSTRACT
This Article critiques the startling arguments made by the In-
ternal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in O’Donnabhain v. Commis-
sioner, a case in which the issue was whether a person diagnosed
with gender identity disorder (“GID”) could take a federal tax de-
duction for the costs of male-to-female medical transition, including
hormone treatment, genital surgery, and breast augmentation. Inter-
nal Revenue Code § 213 allows a deduction for the costs of “medical
care,” which (1) includes costs incurred for “the diagnosis, cure, mit-
igation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body,” but (2) generally
excludes “cosmetic surgery” and “similar procedures.” Courts and the
IRS interpreted the statutory definition of “medical care” consistently
for decades until the IRS made a series of radical arguments in
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner. IRS opposition to
O’Donnabhain’s medical expense deduction tracked the views of Dr.
Paul McHugh, an outspoken opponent of medical transition for
transgender persons and a member of President George W. Bush’s
Council on Bioethics. In his writings, Dr. McHugh, a psychiatrist,
asserts that (1) persons who “claim” to be transgender are delusional,
(2) GID is deviant “behavior,” not a disease, and (3) gender confir-
mation surgery (“GCS”) should be prohibited as “collaborating with
madness” and a moral “abomination.” Views expressed by Dr. Mc-
Hugh in an article, Surgical Sex, appeared in a 2004 letter that the
Traditional Values Coalition sent IRS Commissioner Everson, to de-
mand that the IRS not allow O’Donnabhain a deduction, and in
Chief Counsel Advice issued by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel. Dr.
McHugh’s views also featured prominently in IRS arguments
throughout the subsequent tax litigation.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Email: katherine.pratt@lls.edu.
SSRN author page: http://ssrn.com/author=243531. Faculty webpage: www.lls.edu/
Pratt. Thanks to Simone Darakjian and Sahar Bayat for research assistance. Thanks
also to Ellen Aprill, Brietta Clark, David Cruz, Tony Infanti, Spencer Klein,
Alexandra Markel, Yxta Maya Murray, Alexandra Natapoff, Sarah Precup, and Adam
Zimmerman for helpful corrections, comments, suggestions, and questions.
313
314 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:313
Incorporating excerpts from the extensive O’Donnabhain trial
record (over 1,000 pages), this Article critiques the arguments made
by the IRS in the case, and considers the implications of the case and
the IRS’s arguments going forward—not just in the context of GCS,
but also in the context of other types of medical care, including re-
productive medical care. Part I analyzes the statutory definition of
“medical care” and the “general well-being” and “cosmetic surgery or
other similar procedures” limitations on the definition of “medical
care.” Part II provides background on the facts of the case and the
administrative tax controversy between O’Donnabhain and the IRS,
reveals the significant influence of Dr. McHugh on the tax case,
summarizes the arguments made by O’Donnabhain and the IRS in
the United States Tax Court case, and discusses the Tax Court’s
2010 reviewed decision. Part III analyzes and critiques specific IRS
arguments, some of which were radical departures from long-stand-
ing case law and IRS practices, and highlights similarities between
(1) GCS and (2) breast reconstruction following mastectomy or
lumpectomy, which the IRS acknowledges is medical care, not cos-
metic surgery. Part III also considers the IRS’s arguments as a whole
and concludes that the arguments the IRS made in the case are quite
puzzling as a matter of tax law—but less puzzling when viewed as
a covert attempt by the IRS to discourage GCS on moral grounds. In
addition, Part III objects to the IRS’s negative stereotyping of
O’Donnabhain, medical professionals who specialize in GID, and
transgender persons in general. Part IV distills a series of rules for
interpreting the § 213(d) definition of “medical care” and explores
the implications of the O’Donnabhain case beyond its specific facts.
Part IV also voices a concern that the IRS might deploy similar tax
arguments in the future to deny deductions for other controversial
medical care on covert moral grounds, particularly in the context of
reproductive medical care.
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This Article critiques the startling arguments made by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, a case in which
the issue was whether a person diagnosed with gender identity disorder
(“GID”) could take a federal tax deduction for the costs of male-to-female
medical transition, including hormone treatment, genital surgery, and
breast augmentation.1 Internal Revenue Code § 213 allows a limited
1. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010). The O’Donnabhain decision gener-
ated interesting scholarly commentary, especially from critical tax scholars. See, e.g.,
Anthony C. Infanti, Dissecting O’Donnabhain, 126 TAX NOTES 1403 (2010);
Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of “Others”, 13 GEO. J. GENDER &
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medical expense deduction for the costs of “medical care.”2 Although per-
sonal living expenses generally are nondeductible,3 taxpayers can deduct
their expenses for “medical care” to the extent those expenses exceed ten
percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.4 Section 213(d) defines
medical care to include costs incurred for “the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body.”5 Medical care does not include “cosmetic
surgery” and “similar procedures,” “unless the surgery or procedure is neces-
sary to ameliorate a deformity arising from or directly related to, a congeni-
tal abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or
disfiguring disease.”6 “Cosmetic surgery” is defined as “any procedure which
is directed at improving the taxpayer’s appearance and does not meaning-
fully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or
disease.”7
Courts and the IRS interpreted the statutory definition of “medical
care” consistently for decades until the IRS made a series of radical argu-
ments in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner.8 In this case, the IRS denied
O’Donnabhain a deduction for the costs of her medical transition and as-
serted a tax deficiency of $5,000. During the O’Donnabhain tax contro-
versy, IRS opposition to O’Donnabhain’s medical expense deduction
tracked the views of Dr. Paul McHugh, an outspoken opponent of medical
transition for transgender persons and a member of President George W.
Bush’s Council on Bioethics. In his writings, Dr. McHugh, a psychiatrist,
asserted that (1) persons who “claim” to be transgender are delusional, (2)
gender identity disorder is deviant “behavior,” not a disease, and (3) sex
reassignment surgery (now more commonly referred to as gender confirma-
L. 1 (2011). Numerous student-authored case notes also focused on the
O’Donnabhain case. See, e.g., Lauren Whitney Herman, A Non-Medicalized Medical
Deduction?: O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner & the I.R.S.’s Understanding of Trans-
gender Medical Care, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 487 (2012); Tamar E. Lusztig, De-
ducting the Cost of Sex Reassignment Surgery: How O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner
Can Help Us Make Sense of the Medical Expense, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 86 (2011).
2. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
3. 26 U.S.C.S. § 262 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
4. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
5. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
6. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(9)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
7. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(9)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
8. 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
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tion surgery9) should be prohibited as “collaborating with madness” and a
moral “abomination.”10
Views expressed by Dr. McHugh in a 2004 article, Surgical Sex,11 ap-
peared in a 2004 letter that the Traditional Values Coalition (“TVC”) sent
IRS Commissioner Everson to demand that the IRS not allow a deduction
for O’Donnabhain’s costs of medical transition.12 The IRS Office of Chief
Counsel (headquartered in Washington, D.C.) also cited Surgical Sex in ad-
vice that it issued to the Boston IRS Appeals Office, where O’Donnabhain’s
case was pending.13 Dr. McHugh’s views also featured prominently in IRS
arguments throughout the ensuing tax litigation, and in the testimony and
reports of two IRS expert witnesses. Both of the IRS expert witnesses were
Dr. McHugh’s colleagues at Johns Hopkins Hospital, which stopped per-
forming gender confirmation surgery (“GCS”) during Dr. McHugh’s tenure
as psychiatrist-in-chief.14 In 2010, after years of contentious litigation, a
majority of a sixteen-judge panel of the United States Tax Court held that
O’Donnabhain could deduct the costs of feminizing hormones and genital
surgery as medical expenses but could not deduct the cost of breast augmen-
tation, which the court held was a cosmetic procedure in her case.15
This Article analyzes the extensive trial record in the O’Donnabhain
case, critiques the arguments made by the IRS in the case, and considers the
implications of the case and the IRS’s arguments going forward. Part I ana-
lyzes the statutory definition of the term “medical care,” drawing on the
9. See, e.g., Loren S. Schechter, ‘Gender Confirmation Surgery’: What’s in a Name?, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/loren-s-schechter-
md-facs/gender-confirmation-surgery_b_1442262.html (board certified plastic sur-
geon argues that the terms “sex reassignment surgery” and “sex change operation”
are misnomers, and the term “gender confirmation surgery” better captures the goal
of the surgery, i.e., to bring the patient’s body into congruence with the patient’s
long-identified gender). This Article generally uses “gender confirmation surgery”
(GCS) instead of the term “sex reassignment surgery.”
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex: Why We Stopped Doing Sex Change Operations, FIRST
THINGS (2004), http://www.firstthings.com/article/2004/11/surgical-sex [hereinaf-
ter Surgical Sex].
12. Katherine T. Phan, TVC Asks IRS to Reverse Tax Deduction for Sex-Change Operation,
CHRISTIAN POST (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.christianpost.com/news/tvc-asks-irs-
to-reverse-tax-deduction-for-sex-change-operation-20790/.
13. I.R.S. Chief Coun. Advice 200603025 (Oct. 14, 2005) (released Jan. 20, 2006)
[hereinafter CCA], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0603025.pdf (formal written ad-
vice from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, in Washington DC, to the Boston IRS
office in which O’Donnabhain’s case was being considered by the IRS Appeals
Office).
14. Brief for Respondent, 154–71, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010)
[hereinafter Respondent’s Opening Brief].
15. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 55–76 (2010).
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statutory language of § 213(d)(1)(A) and decades of § 213 cases, Treasury
regulations, administrative rulings, and other administrative pronounce-
ments. In addition, Part I analyzes the “general well-being” limitation and
the § 213(d)(9) “cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures” limitation
on the definition of “medical care.”
Part II provides background on the facts of the case and the adminis-
trative tax controversy between O’Donnabhain and the IRS. Part II also
reveals the significant influence of Dr. McHugh on the tax case, summarizes
the arguments made by O’Donnabhain and the IRS in the United States
Tax Court case, and discusses the Tax Court’s reviewed decision.
Part III begins with a critique of specific IRS arguments: (1) the
§ 213(d) term “disease” is defined very narrowly as internal pathology at the
cellular or molecular level;16 (2) the § 213(d)(9) “cosmetic surgery or other
similar procedures” limitation is applied very broadly to any medical proce-
dures that “improve” “appearance”;17 and (3) the deduction for medical care
also requires that the taxpayer establish that the care was “medically neces-
sary” and “efficacious” (i.e., that the care actually cured the disease and that
the medical care administered is not “controversial”).18 Part III also critiques
the IRS’s arguments as a whole and concludes that the IRS arguments are
quite puzzling as a matter of tax law—but less puzzling when viewed as a
covert attempt by the IRS to discourage GCS and deny it government fund-
ing, consistent with Dr. McHugh’s views.
The hyper-technical tax arguments made by the IRS in the
O’Donnabhain case are objectionable for several reasons. First, the argu-
ments would have radically altered the medical expense deduction, produc-
ing uncertain and arbitrary outcomes. Second, the IRS appears to have
singled out a transgender taxpayer for unfair and dehumanizing treat-
ment—violating its mission statement in the process—by treating
O’Donnabhain like a deceiver and criminal and by making implausible tax
arguments that were “a mask for the politics of disgust.”19 Third, the IRS’s
overt technical arguments for denying the deduction (based on the IRS’s
covert moral objections to the medical procedures involved in the case)
could serve as a blueprint for the future denial of deductions for other medi-
cal expenses on covert moral grounds.
16. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 160–78.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id. at 181–91.
19. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
& CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (2010) (concluding that anti-gay arguments “are too
flimsy to do much work without disgust as a backdrop, or . . . are merely a mask for
the politics of disgust”).
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Part IV distills a series of rules for interpreting the § 213(d) definition
of medical care, as illustrated by the O’Donnabhain case, and explores the
implications of the case beyond its specific facts. For example, Part IV ad-
dresses the deductibility of the costs of other types of medical transition for
transsexual taxpayers, including “top” surgery for transsexual men and facial
feminization surgery for transsexual women. Part IV also voices a concern
that the IRS might make hyper-technical tax arguments as a pretense for
covertly denying medical expense deductions on ethical grounds, particu-
larly in the context of reproductive expenses. For example, the IRS might
challenge deductions for the costs of contraceptives, vasectomies, tubal liga-
tions, fertility treatments (e.g., in vitro fertilization, egg donor, and surro-
gacy), and legal abortions by making the types of hyper-technical—but
implausible—arguments that it made in the O’Donnabhain case.
I. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “MEDICAL CARE”
A. The § 213(d)(1)(A) Definition of “Medical Care”
The O’Donnabhain case focuses on the meaning of the § 213 term
“medical care.” Section 213(a) allows taxpayers to deduct expenses for
“medical care,” to the extent such expenses exceed ten percent of the tax-
payer’s adjusted gross income.20 The § 213(d)(1)(A) definition of “medical
care” provides that deductible medical expenses include costs incurred for
“the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.”21 The deduc-
tion allowed by § 213 is an exception to the general rule, in § 262, that
personal expenses are not deductible.22
Various rationales are posited for the special tax deduction for medical
expenses. The dominant rationale, an ex post fairness or equity rationale, is
that taxpayers who incur significant medical expenses are less able to pay
taxes (the “ability-to-pay” rationale).23 If taxpayer A earns $100,000, tax-
payer B earns $100,000 but must pay $20,000 of medical expenses, and
taxpayer C earns $80,000, the argument is that fairness requires that taxpay-
ers B and C (not A and B) be treated similarly.24 In effect, the binary tax
20. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–219).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. 26 U.S.C.A. § 262 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114–219).
23. Katherine Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 1121, 1162, n. 231 (2004) [hereinafter Pratt, Inconceivable] (the “ability-to-
pay” normative approach “dominates the theoretical literature on the medical ex-
pense deduction”).
24. Id. at 1165 (citing William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972)).
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rule assumes that all medical care is involuntary.25 Medical care qualifies for
the special tax rule whether it is “elective” or not.26 (Virtually all medical
care requires informed consent and thus is elective.) Similarly, a tax reduc-
tion for catastrophic medical expenses incurred by a taxpayer who suffers
from disease or injury might be justified as a gesture of sympathy for such
taxpayers.27 A broader rationale for the medical expense deduction is that
the tax law should promote well-being, and health is central to well-being.28
Some policy commentators have challenged the medical expense deduction,
however, on the grounds that, from an ex ante perspective, the deduction
25. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
“Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 831, 859, 863–64 (1979).
26. See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment: Implications of
Magdalin v. Commissioner for Opposite-Sex Couples, Gay and Lesbian Same-Sex
Couples, and Single Women and Men, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1293–94 [hereinafter
Pratt, Magdalin]:
The fact that a medical procedure is “elective” does not take the procedure
out of the definition of “medical care”; what matters is whether the proce-
dure is for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of “dis-
ease” (broadly construed), or for the purpose of affecting bodily
functioning. Although specific medical procedures . . . are clearly life-saving
emergency procedures, many medical procedures that diagnose, cure, miti-
gate, treat, or prevent disease—or potentially affect functioning—are not
life-saving emergency procedures . . . . An example is elective knee replace-
ment surgery, a procedure that is frequently performed on elderly patients.
The procedure constitutes “medical care,” even if the taxpayer’s motivation
is to be able to play recreational golf or tennis, because the surgery mitigates
a disease or condition. Although playing golf is a personal recreational activ-
ity that does not give rise to tax deductions, the cost of knee surgery to
enable the taxpayer to play golf is “medical care” under section 213.
27. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series
of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51 (2006) (the public feels sympathy towards
disaster victims, and legislators extend tax benefits to such victims to express public
sympathy and solidarity); George Loewenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable and
Iconic Victims and Perpetrators [hereinafter Identifiable Victims] (John M. Olin Pro-
gram in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 2005) (people are “more benefi-
cent toward [identifiable] victims” even if they do not know the victim). Tax
commentators have debated whether sympathy for personal injury victims justifies
the income tax exclusion for personal injury recoveries. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith,
Should “Tax Norms” Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of
Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WISC. L. REV. 1115, 1159–60 (1993) (“[t]ax schol-
ars are split on whether sympathy for the victim can justify a tax exemption for
personal injury recoveries”).
28. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40
HASTINGS L. J. 343, 366 (1989).
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discourages taxpayers from adequately insuring against medical risk and
shifts some of that risk to the federal government.29
The rationales for the medical expense deduction assume that largely
involuntary medical expenses are distinguishable from run-of-the-mill per-
sonal expenses, which are nondeductible under the general rule of § 262.
The fact that a taxpayer may try to classify an otherwise nondeductible
personal expense as a deductible medical expense raises classification issues
that have been explored in cases and administrative pronouncements. Dat-
ing back to the 1950s, the IRS consistently has allowed deductions for ex-
penses that are inherently medical, such as “[h]ospital services, nursing
services. . . , medical, laboratory, surgical, dental, and other diagnostic and
healing services, X-rays, medicine and drugs. . . , artificial teeth or limbs,
and ambulance hire.”30 More difficult classification issues arise, however,
with respect to expenses that taxpayers incur—ostensibly as medical care—
for items (e.g., a pool, vacation, or gym membership) that are usually pur-
chased for non-medical personal reasons.31 In distinguishing between non-
deductible personal expenses and deductible medical expenses for items that
generally are personal, not medical, courts consider various factors and look
for a “direct and proximate relation” between the expense and the medical
care.32 An example is Havey v. Commissioner, a case in which a taxpayer who
lived in Pittsburgh and had heart disease claimed a medical expense deduc-
tion for the costs of vacations to Arizona and the New Jersey shore. The
United States Tax Court stated:
In determining allowability, many factors must be considered.
Consideration should be accorded the motive or purpose of the
taxpayer, but such factor is not alone determinative. . . . [A]lso it
is important to inquire as to the origin of the expense. Was it
29. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical
Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1485, 1487 (1991) (under this view of the medical expense deduction, the federal
government, acting as an insurer, pays a portion of taxpayers’ medical expenses, ar-
guably creating a government insurance subsidy in the form of medical expense
deductions).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957) (“payments for the following are payments for
medical care: hospital services, nursing services . . . medical, laboratory, surgical,
dental, and other diagnostic and healing services, X-rays, medicine and drugs . . .
artificial teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire”). Courts interpreting § 213 distinguish
between “inherently medical” expenses and “nonmedical” expenses. See, e.g., Huff v.
Comm’r, 1995 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 200 (1995) (surgical expense is “inherently
medical” but massage expense is “nonmedical”).
31. See Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23, at 1141 (IRS has broadly construed the § 213
term “disease” to include conditions, impairments, and disorders.).
32. Id. at 1141.
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incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician; did the
treatment bear directly on the physical condition in question;
did the treatment bear such a direct or proximate therapeutic
relation to the body condition as to justify a reasonable belief the
same would be efficacious; was the treatment so proximate in
time to the onset or the recurrence of the disease or condition as
to make one the true occasion for the other, thus eliminating
expense incurred for general, as contrasted with some specific,
physical improvement?33
Treasury Regulation §1.213-1 provides that the medical expense de-
duction is only for “expenses incurred primarily for the prevention or allevi-
ation of a physical or mental defect or illness. . . . [A]n expenditure which is
merely beneficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expendi-
ture for a vacation, is not [deductible].”34 For example, the cost of a gym
membership is not a medical expense, despite the fact that exercise will im-
prove the taxpayer’s health.35 The cost of a medically supervised weight loss
program for a taxpayer diagnosed as “obese” is a medical expense, however,
because obesity is recognized by doctors as a disease or condition.36
Although the regulation, on its face, seems to require that the taxpayer
establish that she suffered from a “disease,” the § 213(d)(1)(A) definition is
written in the disjunctive; an expense that satisfies either the “disease” prong
or the “structure or function” prong is “medical care.” In addition, the IRS
and courts have consistently allowed medical expense deductions—even in
33. Havey v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 409, 412–13 (1949) (holding that the taxpayer, a resi-
dent of Pittsburgh, could not deduct the cost of vacations in New Jersey and Arizona
as medical care, despite her doctor’s recommendation that she go to the seashore in
the summer and Arizona in the winter, and noting that the taxpayer vacationed in
New Jersey and Arizona before she was diagnosed with heart disease, traveled to
Arizona in late November and December, not in the coldest months of winter, and
did not require the services of any medical professionals during the trips; the court
further noted that the vacations probably improved Mrs. Havey’s health, but con-
cluded that the medical benefit of the vacations was incidental and she could not
deduct the cost of the vacations as medical expenses).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957). See also Respondent’s Opening Brief supra
note 14, at 185 (citing cases involving shopping sprees and around-the-world
cruises).
35. Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116.
36. Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-1 CB 778 (obese taxpayer can take a medical expense
deduction for the cost of a medically-supervised weight loss program). Rev. Rul.
2002-19 superseded a prior revenue ruling that concluded that taxpayers could not
deduct the costs of such weight loss programs. The IRS’s change in position was
attributable to the fact that obesity was not recognized as a “disease” when the first
revenue ruling was issued, but was recognized as a “disease” when the second revenue
ruling was issued. See id.
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the absence of “disease”—for the costs of procedures or items that are inher-
ently medical.37 For example, reproductive, obstetric, and preventive medi-
cal procedures performed on healthy patients are classified as medical care.38
In addition, the IRS for decades has interpreted the term “disease” very
broadly to include physical conditions, mental conditions, injuries, impair-
ments, and disorders.39 The implicit and long-standing § 213(d)(1) baseline
for characterization of medical expenses is whether the expense is incurred
primarily to address physical or mental dysfunction and help the patient re-
sume or approximate “normal” functioning.40
1. The § 213(d)(1)(A) Core Concept of Functioning
The concept of functioning plays a central role in the classification of
expenses as medical or nonmedical. An expense is medical if it is incurred
primarily to address dysfunction and help the patient resume or approximate
“normal” functioning.41 Significantly, this Article asserts that functioning
includes internal biological functioning, internal psychological functioning, and
social functioning.
The baseline of normal functioning is implicit in Treasury regulations
and cases that interpret § 213. For example, the regulations provide that a
blind taxpayer can take a medical expense deduction for the cost of a seeing-
eye dog,42 and “the cost of medical care includes the cost of attending a
special school designed to compensate for or overcome a physical handicap,
in order to qualify the individual for future normal education or for normal
37. See Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23, at 1140.
38. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (obstetrical expenses are amounts paid for med-
ical care); Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (cost of birth control pills is an
amount paid for medical care); Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (cost of legal
vasectomy or abortion is an amount paid for medical care); Rev. Rul. 2007-72,
2007-2 C.B. 1154 (costs of annual physical exam, whole-body scan, and pregnancy
test kit are amounts paid for medical care notwithstanding the absence of disease).
Such reproductive care procedures must be legal to constitute medical care, but the
morality of such procedures otherwise is irrelevant for purposes of classifying the
procedures as medical care. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 110 (2010)
(Gustafson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing concerns about
GCS, but conceding that “otherwise deductible medical expenses are not rendered
non-deductible on ethical grounds,” citing to a ruling that the costs of a legal abor-
tion are deductible).
39. See Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23.
40. See id. at 1141–43.
41. See id. at 1143.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) (1960). It is irrelevant whether the blindness was
caused by disease or injury, or was congenital. Id.
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living, such as a school for the teaching of braille or lip reading.”43 Having a
guide dog or learning to read braille does not alter the student’s internal
biological functioning because it does not restore the student’s vision, but it
does improve the student’s social functioning in the world. Similarly, the
costs of a note-taker for a deaf student are deductible,44 not because the
expense restores the student’s internal biological functioning, but because
the note-taker helps the student approximate the functioning of a person
who can hear.
In addition, the very fact that a body does not appear to conform to
cultural norms can stigmatize an individual and create social dysfunction.
For example, the cost of a wig is deductible as medical care if the wig is
purchased for a child or woman who loses hair due to disease.45 Allowing a
deduction for a wig in such cases is consistent with the § 213 emphasis on
functioning because a bald child or woman may face public stigmatization;
baldness thus impairs the child’s or woman’s social functioning.46 On the
other hand, male baldness is not presumed to violate cultural norms or im-
pair social functioning.47  Bald men—unlike bald children and women—
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v)(a). Also, in Revenue Ruling 64-173 the IRS ruled that
the taxpayers could deduct the amounts they paid to a person who served as a guide
for their blind child at school. Rev. Rul. 64-173, 1964-1 C.B. 121 (1964).
44. Baer Est. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 170 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 62-189, 1969-2 C.B. 88 (taxpayer whose daughter had a disease
that caused hair loss could deduct the cost of a wig for her); I.R.S. Pub. 502 (Jan. 11,
2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf [hereinafter Pub. 502] (stating that
the cost of a wig for a taxpayer who lost all hair “from disease” is deductible as
medical care). Hair loss “from disease” may be caused by the disease or by treatment
of the disease (e.g., chemotherapy treatment of cancer).
46. See, e.g., MEREDITH NORTON, LOPSIDED: HOW HAVING BREAST CANCER CAN BE
REALLY DISTRACTING 74 (2008). Norton, who lost her hair during chemotherapy,
describes the awkward, stigmatizing public reaction to a woman appearing bald in
public:
It soon became clear, though, that wearing a wig wasn’t always about my
own comfort. My bald head was like the elephant in the room. People had a
hard time acting normal around me when I was bald. They tended to move
slowly, as if quick motion might reactivate tumor growth, and they spoke
carefully, often whispering and avoiding certain words.
I felt like the whole world had gone mad.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Albert E. Mannes, Shorn Scalps and Perceptions of Male Dominance, SOC.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1 (2012) (male pattern baldness, which affects fifty
percent of men by age fifty, is “common and normal”). Although male pattern bald-
ness is quite common, Mannes notes that it “has important psychological, social, and
economic consequences.” Male pattern baldness has been associated with “poorer
self-esteem and body image [and] depression. Balding men are perceived by others to
be older than their peers by five to ten years and to be less agreeable, less assertive,
and less attractive. Accordingly, men go to great lengths to hide or reverse their
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are not stigmatized as social pariahs because male pattern baldness is so
common. Consistent with this thinking, the IRS takes the position that hair
transplants for bald men are “cosmetic surgery” and thus not medical care
under § 213, notwithstanding the fact that hair transplants affect the
“structure” of the body.48
B. The § 213(d)(9) “Cosmetic Surgery or Other Similar Procedures”
Limitation
Under the second prong of the § 213(d)(1)(A) definition of “medical
care” (the “structure-or-function prong”), the costs of any procedures that
change the structure or function of a taxpayer’s body literally are within the
definition of medical care—even if the taxpayer is healthy and does not
undertake the procedures to reduce dysfunction. During the 1970s and
1980s, the IRS ruled that elective cosmetic surgery expenses, including face-
lifts and electrolysis, were within the structure-or-function prong of the
§ 213(d)(1)(A) definition of medical care, and taxpayers thus could deduct
the costs of such procedures.49 These rulings were consistent with the IRS
assumption that inherently medical surgical procedures (as opposed to inher-
ently non-medical items or procedures) are “medical care.”50 The IRS al-
lowed deductions for the costs of purely cosmetic surgery procedures
undertaken by healthy taxpayers, despite the fact that allowing such deduc-
tions is inconsistent with the “ability-to-pay,” involuntary-expenditure pol-
icy rationale for § 213.
In 1990, Congress amended § 213(d) to eliminate a medical expense
deduction for such purely cosmetic procedures—meaning procedures that
improve appearance, but are not undertaken to reduce dysfunction.51 As
natural hair loss.” Id. (citations omitted). Based on empirical research, however,
Mannes concludes that (1) balding men can reverse the negative effects of balding by
shaving their heads, and (2) men with shaved heads are perceived as taller, stronger,
and more dominant. Id.
48. See, e.g., Pub. 502, supra note 45 at 15 (medical expense deduction is not allowed for
costs of hair transplant, which is “cosmetic surgery”). The 1990 cosmetic surgery
amendment legislatively reversed Rev. Rul. 1982-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48 (1982), in
which the IRS had ruled that a hair transplant was medical care under § 213, be-
cause hair transplants affect the structure or function of the body.
49. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81 (1976) (cost of purely cosmetic “face-
lift” was deductible as a medical expense), Rev. Rul. 82-111 (cost of electrolysis was
deductible as a medical expense).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (“Payments for the following are payments for
medical care: hospital services, nursing services . . . , medical, laboratory, surgical,
dental, and other diagnostic and healing services, X-rays, medicine and drugs . . . ,
artificial teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire.”).
51. See infra note 153.
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amended, § 213(d)(9) excludes “cosmetic surgery or other similar proce-
dures” from the § 213(d)(1)(A) definition of medical care. Section
213(d)(9)(A) provides: “The term ‘medical care’ does not include cosmetic
surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is neces-
sary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congeni-
tal abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or
disfiguring disease.”52 Cosmetic surgery is defined as “any procedure which
is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully
promote the proper function of the body.”53
The legislative history of the 1990 cosmetic surgery amendment refers
to a few specific medical procedures in a binary, dichotomous fashion—as
either “medically necessary” or “purely” cosmetic—but does not thereby
require or define “medical necessity.”54 The legislative history’s example of a
necessary treatment that is deductible “medical care”—breast surgery fol-
lowing mastectomy55—is instructive. Numerous federal and state statutes
mandate insurance coverage for breast reconstruction following mastec-
tomy, notwithstanding the conclusion of the insurance industry that breast
reconstruction is not “medically necessary.”56 The rationale for such statutes
52. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(9)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
53. 26 U.S.C.S. § 213(d)(9)(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219).
54. 136 CONG. REC. 30, 570 (1990).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act (“WHRCA”) of 1998, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-221), 42 U.S.C. § 300(gg)-52
(Westlaw through Pub. L. 114-221) (federal statute mandating coverage of breast
reconstruction after mastectomy). For state coverage mandates (requiring post-mas-
tectomy breast reconstruction for various types of insurance plans), see ALA. CODE
§ 22-6-10 (Westlaw through Act 2016-429 of the 2016 First Special Sess.); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 18, § 3347 (Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch. 427); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 18, § 3563 (Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch. 427); D.C. CODE § 31-
3832 (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6417 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.6612 (Westlaw through 2016 Second Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 641.31 (Westlaw through 2016 Second Reg. Sess.); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/10-4-2(d-15) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-872 of the 2016 Reg. Sess); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356g(b) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-872 of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-6.1 (Westlaw through P.A. 99-872 of the
2016 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE. ANN. § 27-8-5-26 (Westlaw through 2016 Second
Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE. ANN. § 27-13-7-14 (Westlaw through 2016 Second Reg.
Sess.); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-35.35(509) (Westlaw through 2016); IOWA AD-
MIN. CODE r. 191-71.23(513B) (Westlaw through 2016); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r.
191-75.17(513C) (through 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2,166 (Westlaw through
2016 Reg. and Special Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-3163 (Westlaw
through 2016 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-134 (Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.18-0983 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.32-1593 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.38-1934 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV.
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is that breast reconstruction surgery not only is necessary, but is “essential”
or even “life-saving”;57 such breast surgery is not—as insurance companies
asserted—cosmetic surgery.58 The breast surgery mandates require coverage
of the costs of reconstruction of a breast that is surgically removed due to a
malignancy.59 Such statutes also frequently mandate coverage for the costs
of reducing or removing a healthy breast (where one breast is removed, due
to cancer, but the other breast is healthy) and reconstructing the healthy
breast to create symmetry between the two breasts.60 In addition, some
STAT. ANN. § 22:272(E) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:1077 (through 2016 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2209 (repealed
2016); ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2837-C(2) (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 4237(2) (2015);
ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2320-C(2) (2015); MD. CODE. ANN., Ins. § 15-815 (Lexis-
Nexis 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-1-43 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1209
(2016); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-22-135 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-797
(2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.157 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616C.185 (2016);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.395 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.041 (2016); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 689B.0375 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 695B.191 (2016); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 695C.171 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417-D:2-b (2016); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:48-6b (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48A-7b (2015); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 17:48E-35 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-2.1(a) (2015); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:27-46.1a (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.14, N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3216(i)(20) (Consol. 2015); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(k)(10) (Consol. 2015); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 4303(x)(1) (Consol. 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-62 (2015); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-65-96 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-67-79 (2015); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 36, § 6060.5 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 743A.110 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 27-18-39 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-34 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-20-
29 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-43 (2016); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:06:39:25(23)
(2016); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:06:39:28(23) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 56-7-2507
(2015); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1357.004 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
22-630 (LexisNexis 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2818(B)(9) (2016); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-3418.4 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.20.395 (2015); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48.21.230 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.44.330
(2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.46.280 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 5-16-7(c)
(2002); W. VA. CODE § 33-15-4g (2015); W. VA. CODE § 33-16-3p (2015); W.
VA. CODE § 33-24-7g (2015); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-8f (2015).
57. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 27, 499 (1998) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (describing
breast reconstruction after mastectomy as “critical,” “essential,” and “life saving”).
58. Id. (recounting the story of Janet Franquet, whose insurer denied coverage of breast
reconstruction surgery on the grounds that the procedure was “cosmetic surgery”
and not “medically necessary”). Senator D’Amato described the insurer’s position as
“outrageous” and argued that “[i]t is absolutely unacceptable and wrong that many
insurers have decided that this essential surgery is ‘cosmetic.’” Id.
59. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.S. § 1185(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (federal
mandate to cover breast reconstruction following mastectomy); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 743A.110 (2012) (Oregon’s state insurance mandate to cover breast reconstruction
after mastectomy).
60. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 417-D:2-b (2016) (requiring insurers who provide cov-
erage for mastectomy surgery to also provide coverage for “reconstruction of the
328 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:313
breast surgery mandates require coverage of the costs of surgically construct-
ing a simulated (although non-sensate) areola on the surgically constructed
breast.61 Patients who want breast reconstruction, but do not want artificial
silicone or water implants, sometimes opt for complex “tissue flap” or “trans
flap” procedures, in which healthy tissue is removed from the patient’s abdo-
men, buttocks, thigh, or back to reconstruct a breast.62
Why is breast reconstruction surgery following mastectomy described
as “necessary,” “essential,” or “life-saving”?  If such surgery is necessary, it is
because it is psychologically necessary and perhaps socially necessary—not be-
cause it is internally, biologically necessary for life.63 A patient whose breast
is removed will not die without breast reconstruction; such a patient may
suffer psychologically and socially, however, if the breast is not recon-
structed.64 In addition, if only one breast is removed due to a malignancy,
the patient may suffer distress unless the healthy breast also is removed and
reconstructed to achieve “symmetry” with the new breast that replaced the
diseased breast.65 The distress of post-mastectomy patients is a form of body
dysmorphia that breast reconstruction can address.66
breast on which surgery has been performed and surgery and reconstruction of the
other breast to produce a symmetrical appearance . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-67-79 (2015) (requiring HMOs to cover “recon-
structive breast surgery” following mastectomy and defining “reconstructive breast
surgery” to include “creation of a new nipple/areolar complex”); see also AM. CAN-
CER SOC’Y, BREAST RECONSTRUCTION AFTER MASTECTOMY, http://www.cancer.
org/acs/groups/cid/documents/webcontent/002992-pdf.pdf [hereinafter BREAST RE-
CONSTRUCTION] (describing surgical and tattooing processes for creating a simulated
areole).
62. See BREAST RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 61 (describing various types of “tissue
flap” procedures in which non-breast tissue from the patient’s body is used to create
a reconstructed breast).
63. Prior to the enactment of breast reconstruction mandates, insurance companies de-
nied coverage of breast reconstruction surgery on the grounds that the surgery is not
medically necessary for the body to function. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 27,499
(1998) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (insurance executive told Senator D’Amato
“ ‘replacement of a breast is not medically necessary and not covered under the plan.
This is not a bodily function and therefore cannot and should not be replaced.’”).
64. See, e.g., Drew B. Metcalfe et al., Prevalence of Body Dysmorphic Disorder Among
Patients Seeking Breast Reconstruction, 34 AESTHETIC SURGERY J. 733 (2014) (finding
post-mastectomy patients suffer disproportionately from body dysmorphia); see also
Mary Armao McCarthy, Re-Imagining, in VOICES OF BREAST CANCER: THE HEAL-
ING COMPANION: STORIES FOR COURAGE, COMFORT AND STRENGTH, 181–82
(The Healing Project, 2007) (removal of diseased breast was followed by “clinically
curative” mastectomy of healthy breast and “emotionally healing” breast
reconstruction).
65. McCarthy, supra note 64.
66. Id.
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Post-mastectomy breast reconstruction addresses the internal psy-
chological dysfunction and social dysfunction caused by a disfiguring
mastectomy.67 Post-mastectomy patients also undertake breast reconstruc-
tion, especially reconstruction to achieve symmetry, in part to improve
appearance.68 According to the legislative history, the fact that breast recon-
struction is partially motivated by a desire to improve a patient’s appearance
does not render the reconstruction “cosmetic,” for purposes of
§ 213(d)(9).69
The definition of “medical care” and the scope of the “cosmetic
surgery” exception were the central legal issues in O’Donnabhain v. Commis-
sioner.70 Part II provides background on the case, explanation of the parties’
arguments in the Tax Court litigation, and a summary of the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in the case.
67. See, e.g., Metcalfe, supra note 64, at 735 (concluding that “women who undergo
mastectomy experience a psychologically fragile period with psychosocial sequelae,
including loss of femininity, mood disturbances, and interpersonal, sexual and mari-
tal dysfunction,” and a significant percentage of such women develop body dys-
morphic disorder).
68. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 46, at 198. Norton provides this account of a conver-
sation with her doctor, which illustrates the mixed appearance-and-functioning con-
cerns of post-mastectomy patients who want breast reconstruction:
At my next appointment I asked Dr. Stone about getting breast reconstruc-
tion. He’d just given me a breast (singular) exam and I sat in front of him
topless.
“I was thinking about getting a new one, and the old one fixed up. I
wouldn’t want a new saggy one to match the old saggy one; and I sure
don’t want a perky new one to mismatch the old saggy one.”
“What are you talking about?” he asked.
“The old boob is not cute. I want two cute boobs.”
Id. As this passage illustrates, wanting breast “symmetry” is partly about the desire to
improve appearance, but breast reconstruction and post-mastectomy symmetry also
significantly affect internal psychological functioning and social functioning in pub-
lic and private settings. The widespread adoption of breast reconstruction mandates
constitutes a public recognition of the critical importance of breast reconstruction
for post-mastectomy functioning.
69. 136 CONG. REC. 30,485 (1990).
70. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
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II. O’DONNABHAIN V. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE71
A. The Facts
Rhiannon G. O’Donnabhain is a transsexual woman.72 Although she
was born a biological male,73 she experienced psychological discomfort in
the male gender role from an early age.74 O’Donnabhain eventually married
and had children, but her feeling that “she was woman who was trapped in
a male body” persisted throughout her twenty-year marriage.75 After her
71. 134 T.C. 34.
72. The briefs and opinion in the O’Donnabhain case characterize the taxpayer as a
“transsexual woman.” See, e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 34; Post-Trial Brief of
Petitioner Rhiannon G. O’Donnabhain at 21, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C.
34 (2010) (No. 6402-06) [hereinafter Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner]. The term
“transsexual” typically refers to individuals who transition from assigned-female-at-
birth to male (“FTM”) or from assigned-male-at-birth to female (“MTF”). Shawn
Thomas Meerkamper, Contesting Sex Classification: The Need for Genderqueers as a
Cognizable Class, WILLIAMS INST. DUKEMINIER AWARDS J. (2013), http://william-
sinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Meerkamper-Dukeminier-Student-Note-
2013.pdf. The term sometimes is defined more narrowly to refer only to individuals
who undertake medical treatment (for example gender-related hormone therapy and
surgery) to transition. Id. The more inclusive terms “transgender” or “trans” often
are used to refer to individuals who do not conform to the assigned-at-birth gender,
including transsexuals as well as individuals who do not identify as male or female or
who reject binary gender classification. See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical
Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 713 n.1 (2005). The term “cisgender” is used to refer to
individuals who are not transgender. FENWAY HEALTH, GLOSSARY OF GENDER AND
TRANSGENDER TERMS (2010), www.lgbthealtheducation.org/wp-content/uploads/
Handout_7-C_Glossary_of_Gender_and_Transgender_Terms__fi.pdf [hereinafter
GLOSSARY].
73. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35. “Biological sex” is “the configuration of chromo-
somes, internal organs, external genitalia, hormonal output of the endocrine glands,
secondary sex characteristics, and other somatic indicia of male, female, and intersex
conditions.” Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 120 (Dietz testimony).
Some transgender activists challenge references to a transgender person’s “biological
sex,” because use of the term discounts the lived experience of transgender persons.
See, e.g., Charlotte Allen, The Transgender Triumph, WEEKLY STANDARD (Mar. 2,
2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-transgender-triumph/article/859614
(MTF activist Mari Brighe objects to references to genes or biology and asserts: “ ‘I
wasn’t born a boy, and I’ve never been a boy, and it’s like a knife to my heart every
time I hear that phrase.’”).
74. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35. Gender roles are “the male, female and cross-gender
social roles that people adopt in their public behavior, sometimes only in particular
settings or on particular occasions.” Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at
120 (Dietz testimony).
75. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35.
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marriage ended, her feeling that she was female intensified.76 In August
1996, she began psychotherapy with Diane Ellaborn, a licensed indepen-
dent clinical social worker who specialized in gender-related disorders and
was authorized under state law to diagnose and treat psychiatric illnesses.77
In January 1997, after twenty therapy sessions, Ellaborn diagnosed
O’Donnabhain as “a transsexual suffering from severe Gender Identity Dis-
order (GID),”78 a psychiatric diagnostic code in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders, which is widely used by mental health
professionals.79 Patients suffering from severe GID experience profound dis-
tress or impairment in functioning as a result of the incongruence between
their persistent perceived gender identity and their biological sex.80
Ellaborn recommended the GID treatment protocol known as the
Harry Benjamin standards of care,81 which, among medical experts who
treat GID, is the consensus view regarding appropriate care for GID
76. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35.
77. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 36.
78. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 34.
79. The last three versions of the DSM are: (1) AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., 1994) [hereinafter
DSM-IV]; (2) AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; and (3)
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. This Article generally refers to DSM-
IV-TR, the version that was cited in the case. See, e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at
36–37 (citing DSM-IV-TR repeatedly).
80. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 79, at 586–82 (defining and providing diagnostic criteria
for Gender Identity Disorder). “Gender identity” is defined as “[a] person’s innate,
deeply-felt psychological identification as a man, woman, or something else, which
may or may not correspond to the person’s external body or assigned sex at birth
(i.e., the sex listed on the birth certificate).” See GLOSSARY, supra note 72. DSM-5
replaced the term “gender identity disorder” with the term “gender dysphoria.” The
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for gender dyspohoria are similar to the DSM-IV-TR
diagnostic criteria for GID (including “clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning”). See also AM. PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 GENDER DYSPHORIA FACT SHEET (2003), http://
www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf [hereinafter
DSM-5 FACT SHEET].
81. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 39. The Benjamin standards of care were developed by
the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, which later was
renamed the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (“WPATH”).
WPATH is an international organization with around 350 members, all of whom
work (in clinical or research settings) with patients who have “the full spectrum of
gender problems, including GID . . . .” Transcript of Record, at 269, O’Donnabhain
v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010) (No. 6402-06) [hereinafter Trial Transcript] (direct
examination of Dr. George Brown, a member of WPATH).
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patients.82 The Benjamin standards of care include a “triadic” sequence of
care for GID patients who choose to undertake gender transition. Under
the first step of this sequence, the patient begins with hormone treatment,
i.e., by taking prescription sex-specific hormones that reduce the incongru-
ence between the patient’s body and the patient’s perceived gender.
O’Donnabhain, who was referred by Ellaborn to an endocrinologist in
February 1997, began taking feminizing hormones in September 1997, and
has taken them continuously since that time.83
O’Donnabhain’s positive response to the hormone treatment, coupled
with her strong desire to further reduce the incongruity between her per-
ceived gender and biological sex, led Ellaborn to recommend that
O’Donnabhain proceed to the second step of the triadic sequence: the “real-
life” experience. At this stage of the treatment, the patient presents as the
perceived gender full-time in public. In the spring of 2000, O’Donnabhain
changed her legal name, had surgical facial feminization (“FFM”) (a tracheal
shave to reduce the size of her Adam’s apple), and began the real-life experi-
ence.84 During the FFM surgery, and in a subsequent surgery in December
2000, O’Donnabhain also underwent various other medical procedures that
altered her appearance.85 She also changed her gender designation on her
driver’s license, in July 2000,86 and carried with her a letter from Ellaborn,
“to be used in the event she was confronted by authorities for using a sex-
segregated facility such as a restroom or a changing room.”87 O’Donnabhain
had a positive response to the real-life experience, which included presenting
as a woman at her project manager job in the construction industry. Her
distress regarding her male anatomy persisted, however. Ellaborn concluded
that O’Donnabhain’s impairment from her severe GID would persist unless
she had sex reassignment surgery,88 more commonly referred to now as
“gender-confirmation surgery” (“GCS”).89 GCS is the third and final step
in the triadic sequence for gender transition.
In November 2000, Ellaborn wrote to Dr. Meltzer, a plastic and re-
constructive surgeon who specialized in GCS. Dr. Meltzer’s office put
O’Donnabhain’s name on the doctor’s waiting list for an initial appoint-
ment. In June 2001, O’Donnabhain travelled to Portland, Oregon, for an
82. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 286 (Benjamin standards of care are the interna-
tional standard of care).
83. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 39.
84. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 39.
85. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 139–40.
86. Id. at 16 (referring to Stipulation Paragraph 58).
87. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 40 n.15.
88. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 39–40.
89. See, e.g., Schechter, supra note 9.
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initial examination and consultation with Dr. Meltzer, who concluded that
O’Donnabhain was a good candidate for the surgery. In July 2001, Ellaborn
wrote to Dr. Meltzer to (1) certify that O’Donnabhain met all of the requi-
site criteria for the third stage of care, GCS, and (2) formally recommend
that O’Donnabhain have GCS.90 Dr. Coleman, a Ph.D. clinical psycholo-
gist, also examined O’Donnabhain and recommended GCS.91
Dr. Meltzer performed O’Donnabhain’s GCS on October 19, 2001.
The surgery included: (1) penectomy and bilateral orchiectomy (the surgical
removal of O’Donnabhain’s penis and testicles); (2) vaginoplasty,
clitoroplasty, and labiaplasty (construction of a vagina, clitoris, and labia,
using sensitive tissue from the penis, scrotum, and glans, to create genitalia
that appear and function as female genitalia); and (3) breast augmentation
and shaping (at a cost of $4,500), to enlarge O’Donnabhain’s breasts and
make the placement of the breasts on O’Donnabhain’s chest look more
feminine.92 In 2002, O’Donnabhain took a medical expense deduction for
her gender transition medical costs on her 2001 tax return.93 These deduc-
tions subsequently were disallowed by the IRS.
Part II.B. explains the political context within which the tax contro-
versy arose between O’Donnabhain and the IRS, focusing on the views of
Dr. Paul McHugh, a psychiatrist and member of President George W.
Bush’s Counsel on Bioethics, who espouses controversial opinions that are
hostile to transgender persons and GCS. Parts II.C. and II.D. chronicle the
O’Donnabhain tax controversy and the extent to which Dr. McHugh’s con-
troversial ethical and moral views on GCS and transgender persons influ-
enced the tax arguments made by the IRS in the case.
B. The Political Context
In 2002, the year in which the O’Donnabhain tax controversy began,
Dr. Paul McHugh, a vocal opponent of medical transition for transgender
patients, was serving as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics
90. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 34.
91. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 41. A second letter was required for O’Donnabhain
because Linda Ellaborn was a licensed independent clinical social worker, not an
M.D. or Ph.D. Under the Benjamin standards of care, if the initial letter formally
recommending GCS is not from an M.D. or Ph.D. psychologist, a second letter
from either a psychiatrist or Ph.D. clinical psychologist must be submitted to au-
thorize the GCS. See Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 446 (cross-examination of
expert witness Dr. George Brown).
92. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 41. The medical terms for the various surgical proce-
dures are defined in Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 71.
93. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 42.
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under President George W. Bush.94 Dr. McHugh’s powerful influence on
the medical treatment of transgender persons dates back to 1975, when he
became psychiatrist-in-chief at Johns Hopkins Hospital, which had pio-
neered GCS in the 1960s.95 From the time he started working there, Dr.
McHugh questioned the morality of GCS and intended to end the GCS
program at Johns Hopkins.96 He objected to the removal of healthy tissue,
asserting that “moral matters,” including “the ghastliness of the mutilated
anatomy,” “should have some salience.”97 In McHugh’s view, inviolate
moral standards are a necessary constraint on autonomy and the practice of
psychiatry;98 he saw GCS as the worst example of “cultural antinomianism”
and “psychiatric misdirection.”99 His characterization of GCS as “cultural
94. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, President Names
Members of Bioethics Council (Jan. 16, 2002), http://georgewbush-white
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116-9.html [hereinafter Bush
Bioethics Council Press Release] (“The Council’s paramount objective will be to
develop a deep understanding of the issues that it considers and to advise the Presi-
dent of the complex and often competing moral positions associated with biomedical
innovation.”). The press release highlights Dr. McHugh’s writings on “assisted sui-
cide and the misuse of psychiatry.” Dr. McHugh’s writings on the misuse of psychia-
try argue that GCS is immoral and should not be performed. See, e.g., Paul R.
McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures, AM. SCHOLAR, Autumn 1992 [hereinafter
Psychiatric Misadventures] (concluding that GCS is the “grimmest” example of psy-
chiatric misdirection combined with a lawless ethic of autonomy).
95. Psychiatric Misadventures, supra note 94.
96. Id. (GCS started at Johns Hopkins and “[i]t was part of my intention, when I arrived
in Baltimore in 1975, to help end it.”).
97. Id. at 502. In McHugh’s view, Hopkins’ plastic surgeons obtained their skills in
reconstructing the genito-urinary tract “not to treat the gender identity problem, but
to repair congenital defects, injuries and the effects of destructive diseases such as
cancer in this region of the body.”
98. Id. at 503 (Although a culture of autonomy encourages GCS, “[m]oral matters
should have some salience here.”).
99. Id. at 501 (“This interrelationship of cultural antinomianism and a psychiatric mis-
placed emphasis is seen at its grimmest in the practice known as sex-reassignment
surgery.”). At Johns Hopkins, Dr. McHugh liked to remind his colleagues of the
Serenity Prayer: “God, give me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the
courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference.” Surgical
Sex, supra note 11. The moral standards he espouses are consistent with the Christian
conception of the human body as sacred—and starkly inconsistent with the notion
of unfettered autonomy to alter the body.
Jonathan Haight astutely observes that many controversies between liberals
and conservatives can be understood fundamentally as conflicts between an ethic of
autonomy and an ethic of divinity:
On issue after issue, liberals want to maximize autonomy by removing lim-
its, barriers, and restrictions. The religious right, on the other hand, wants
to structure personal, social, and political relationships in three dimensions
and so create a landscape of purity and pollution where restrictions main-
tain the separation of the sacred and the profane. For the religious right,
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antinomianism” is telling. In its original theological context, antinomianism
“is a pejorative term for the teaching that Christians are under no obligation
to obey the laws of ethics . . . or morality,” because their sins are forgiven by
the grace of God:100 “Theological charges of antinomianism typically imply
that the opponent’s doctrine leads to various sorts of licentiousness, and
imply that the antinomian chooses his theology in order to further a career
of dissipation.”101
Dr. McHugh also doubted the therapeutic benefits of GCS and en-
couraged his colleagues to “test the claim that men who had undergone sex-
change surgery found resolution for their many general psychological
problems.”102 In 1979, Dr. Jon Meyer (Dr. McHugh’s colleague at Johns
Hopkins) published a controversial study in which he concluded that the
psycho-social condition of post-operative GCS patients was no better than
before the surgery, although most of the patients expressed satisfaction with
the surgery and had no regrets about it.103 That year, Dr. McHugh ended
the GCS program at Johns Hopkins,104 based on his conclusion that “pro-
ducing a ‘satisfied’ but still troubled patient seemed an inadequate reason
for surgically amputating normal organs.”105
Dr. McHugh also opposed the “medicalization” of “destructive behav-
iors where choices play a role,” including deviant sexual behavior.106 He
hell on earth is a flat land of unlimited freedom where selves roam around
with no higher purpose than expressing and developing themselves.
JONATHAN HAIGHT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN
ANCIENT WISDOM 209–10 (2006).
100. Antinomianism, THEOPEDIA, http://www.theopedia.com/antinomianism (last visited
March 26, 2016).
101. Id.
102. Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
103. Surgical Sex, supra note 11; Paul McHugh, Transgender Surgery Isn’t the Solution,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/paul-mchugh-transgender
-surgery-isnt-the-solution-1402615120 [hereinafter Transgender Surgery] (most of
the post-surgical patients “described themselves as ‘satisfied’ with the results, but
their subsequent psycho-social adjustments were not better than those who didn’t
have the surgery.”).
104. Rachel Witkin, Hopkins Hospital: A History of Sex Reassignment, JOHNS HOPKINS
NEWSLETTER (May 1, 2014), http://www.jhunewsletter.com/2014/05/01/hopkins-
hospital-a-history-of-sex-reassignment-76004/. Dr. McHugh, the Psychiatrist-in-
Chief at Johns Hopkins “who never supported the University offering the surgeries
. . . shut the program down” following the publication of a study written by Johns
Hopkins psychiatrist Dr. Jon Meyer. Id.
105. Transgender Surgery, supra note 103.
106. See Letter from Paul McHugh, Prof. of Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins Univ. Sch. of
Med., to Leon Kass, Chairman, President’s Council on Bioethics (June 3, 2003),
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/background/kass_mchugh.html [here-
inafter Kass-McHugh Letters] (in discussing what should not be medicalized, Mc-
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posited a topology of four “classes” of psychiatric problems “to help limit
the medicalization of mental life.”107 Dr. McHugh’s classes include: “dis-
eases” (i.e., “[internal, biological] conditions encompassing the diseases of
the brain such as dementia, manic-depression, [and] schizophrenia”); and
“behaviors” (i.e., “conditions encompassing destructive behaviors where
choices play a role, such as sexual paraphilias and drug addictions”).108
According to Dr. McHugh, disorders within each class “share a common
identifiable basic nature,” and the treatments that are “appropriate” vary
based on the class.109 In his view, a patient’s claimed “transgenderism” is
“behavior” (i.e., sexual deviance and paraphilia110) chosen by the patient,
not a “disease.”111
Dr. McHugh’s writings on the “medicalization” of behavior further
express his moral misgivings about alterations of the body in the name of
autonomy. He expressed his views on the topic during the time he served on
Hugh refers to “destructive behaviors where choices play a role such as sexual
paraphilias”).
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added). The third class is “dimensions,” (i.e., “conditions encompass-
ing the problematic dispositions such as the mentally subnormal, the histrionic, and
the immature who face emotional problems because of their dispositional vulnerabil-
ities”). Id. The fourth class is “life stories” (i.e., “conditions derived from troubled
life experiences, social maladjustments, and disruptive assumptions such as grief,
jealousy, homesickness and demoralization”). Id.
109. Id. Dr. McHugh asserts that his proposed classification system “permits an honest
conversation with patients as to what are truly beneficial treatments and what may
cheat them. The aim is to identify both the place and the limits of psychiatric exper-
tise and restrict the medical treatment of human mental life to those limits.” Id.
110. A paraphilia is “a sexual disorder characterized by recurrent intense sexual urges,
sexually arousing fantasies, or behavior involving use of a nonhuman object, the
suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or children or other nonconsent-
ing partners.” MILLER-KEANE & MARIE T. O’TOOLE, MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH (7th ed.
2003). For example, paraphilias include “fetishism, frotteurism, pedophilia, exhibi-
tionism, voyeurism, sexual masochism, and sexual sadism.” Id.
111. For a discussion of Dr. McHugh’s “behavioral” perspective, see Philip J. Overby,
Psychiatry’s Healer, 15 NEW ATLANTIS 99 (2007). Overby states in relevant part:
The Behavior perspective highlights the fact that in certain disorders the
patient’s behavior itself contributes to or is itself the disorder, e.g., alcohol-
ism. The immediate goal is to stop the behavior, and only later to address
the co-morbid conditions such as depression. To do otherwise is to treat the
symptoms and ignore the root disease. Because no cure can be offered in the
absence of the minimum condition of stopping the behavior, the impor-
tance of behavior as distinct from the disease requires emphasis.
Id. at 103 (emphasis in original).
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President Bush’s Council on Bioethics.112 A recurring theme in correspon-
dence between Dr. McHugh and Dr. Kass (Chair of the Council) is their
shared ethical concerns about the increasing “medicalization” of various
conditions and disorders, in particular mental conditions and disorders.113
Their correspondence “define[s] ‘medicalization’ as that view reducing all
forms of human distress and disorder to aspects of ‘sickness’, expressions of
‘patient-hood’ and thus expressly open to technical, mostly bio-medical,
correction at the hands of experts for whom ideas of good and evil, freedom
and responsibility, sanctity and sin, approval and reprobation are meaning-
less.”114 In keeping with these views, Dr. McHugh drew ethical distinctions
between various types of medical and dental procedures that alter
appearance:
We offer some medical/surgical treatments to people who are
“whole” but would like help to “fit in.” We see no ethical con-
cern in such practices as orthodontia because both dental func-
tion and appearance are enhanced. Face-lifts and “tummy-tucks”
begin to provoke concern that we are going beyond the sick, but
we accept them—sometimes with an embarrassed laugh over our
vanities. Finally, sex change operations and limb amputations for
sexual desirability we sometimes see as abominations.115
Dr. McHugh has campaigned against GCS for decades. He argues
that what he terms “transgenderism” is a mental disorder of “assumption”:
just as a patient with anorexia nervosa has a disordered assumption that she
is overweight, contrary to “physical reality”, a trans woman has a disordered
assumption that “he” is female, contrary to the “physical reality” of “his”
male sex.116 McHugh posited that “sexual identity” (assumed to be rigidly
binary) is biologically and immutably determined by genes and prenatal
hormonal milieu (i.e., the embryonic exposure to sex hormones during
112. See Bush Bioethics Council Press Release, supra note 94; Kass-McHugh Letters, supra
note 106.
113. See Kass-McHugh Letters, supra note 106.
114. Id.
115. Id. (emphasis added). See also infra note 133–34.
116. See Transgender Surgery, supra note 103. Dr. McHugh used the term “transgender-
ism” in his writings. See id. In describing his writings, this Article uses his terminol-
ogy. Note, however, that transgender persons generally do not use this term.
Transgenderism “is a term used by anti-transgender activists to dehumanize trans-
gender people and reduce who they are to ‘a condition.’” GLAAD MEDIA REFER-
ENCE GUIDE—TRANSGENDER ISSUES, http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016).
338 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:313
gestation).117 He concluded that GCS should not be performed on a biolog-
ically “normal”—but mentally disordered—male who wants to become a
woman:118
It is not obvious how this patient’s feeling that he is a woman
trapped in a man’s body differs from the feeling of a patient with
anorexia nervosa that she is obese despite her emaciated cachec-
tic state. We don’t do liposuction on anorexics. Why amputate
the genitals of these poor men? Surely the fault is in the mind,
not the member.119
Dr. McHugh’s conclusion was that patients who “claim”120 to be trans-
gender need their minds fixed, not their genitals.121 In his view, performing
GCS on such patients is “fundamentally cooperating with a mental illness,”
and “collaborating with madness.”122
Over several decades, Dr. McHugh has taken many controversial posi-
tions on transgenderism, GCS, and the classification and treatment of vari-
ous types of mental illness. For example, he opined that biological men who
want to medically transition to being female can be divided into two
groups: (1) homosexual men who are conflicted about their homosexuality
and want to become female so they can feel less conflicted about being with
male sexual partners; and (2) men (typically older men who have lived their
adult lives as heterosexuals) with “autogynephilia,”123 which is defined as “a
male’s paraphilic tendency to be sexually aroused by the thought or image
117. See Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
118. Id.
119. Psychiatric Misadventures, supra note 94, at 503. This quote focuses entirely on trans
women and ignores trans men. Discussions about transgender persons, even among
feminist writers, tend to be dominated by the MTF model. See Talia Bettcher, Femi-
nist Perspectives on Trans Issues, 31 STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY 39, 45, Spring
2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/feminism-trans (noting
“the over-emphasis on MTFs” and the “the male-to-female dominance in trans
contexts”).
120. Id. at 502 (“[T]he patient [who wants GCS] claims it is a torture for him to live as a
man. . . . The patient’s claim that this has been a lifelong problem is seldom checked
with others who have known him since childhood.”) (emphasis added); Paul Mc-
Hugh, Transgenderism: A Pathogenic Meme, PUB. DISCOURSE (June 10, 2015), http://
www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/06/15145/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2016) [herein-
after Pathogenic Meme] (“[f]or forty years [as a psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins] I’ve
been studying people who claim to be transgender”).
121. Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Surgical Sex, supra note 11. (opining that men with autogynephilia “found
intense sexual arousal in cross-dressing as females” and wanted GCS “to add more
verisimilitude to their costumes”); Pathogenic Meme, supra note 120 (commenting
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of himself as a woman.”124 Dr. McHugh is a strong proponent of auto-
gynephilia theory, despite the fact that the theory has been questioned from
many quarters.125 The tenets of autogynephilia theory, including the follow-
ing, are categorical and extreme:
Autogynephilia is always present in non-homosexual male-to-fe-
male transsexuals (MTFs) and always absent in homosexual
MTFs; those non-homosexual MTFs who deny autogynephilia
and those homosexual MTFs who report autogynephilia are mis-
taken or in denial; autogynephila is a paraphilia; autogynephilia
is an orientation; autogynephilia is the motivation of non-homo-
sexual MTFs to seek [GCS]; autogynephilia is clinically impor-
tant; and non-homosexual MTFs have difficulty with pair
bonding due to their autogynephilic interests.126
Autogynephilia theory has been contested by medical experts, clini-
cians, researchers, and transgender persons. For example, in a 2010 peer-
reviewed article, Dr. Charles Moser concludes that many aspects of the the-
ory are flawed, although it “can explain the motivation of some MTFs.”127
He reviews the empirical evidence for and against each of the posited impli-
cations of autogynephilia theory and concludes that “[c]ontrary to the con-
clusions of [the theory’s] proponents, many of the tenets of the theory are
not supported by the existing data, or both supporting and contradictory
data exist.”128 Among his arguments, Dr. Moser concludes that auto-
gynephilia is not a paraphilia because anti-androgens, which reduce sex
drive, do not reduce the desire of MTFs to transition, but do reduce the
desire of paraphiliacs to act on their sexual desires.129 Transwomen also ada-
mantly reject autogynephilia theory, especially its singular focus on erotic
sex, as inconsistent with their lived experience.130
that photo of Caitlyn Jenner on the cover of Vanity Fair “suggests” that Jenner suf-
fers from autogynephilia).
124. Charles Moser, Blanchard’s Autogynephilia Theory: A Critique, 57 J. HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY 790, 791 (2010) [hereinafter Autogynephilia Critique] (peer-reviewed article eval-
uating and critiquing Dr. Blanchard’s autogynephilia theory).
125. Id. at 791 (citation omitted) (noting that “professionals, researchers and transsexuals
have been very critical of this theory”).
126. Id. at 792 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 790 (concluding that “although autogynephilia exists, the theory is flawed”).
128. Id. at 805.
129. Id. at 800.
130. See, e.g., Anna Magdalena, A Critique of Paul McHugh’s ‘Surgical Sex’, CATHOLIC
TRANS BLOG (Feb. 9, 2014), https://catholictrans.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/a-cri-
tique-of-paul-mchughs-surgical-sex/ (theory of autogynephilia “ignores the majority
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Dr. McHugh also has taken other controversial positions on trans-
genderism, GCS, and sexual deviance. He maintains that the focus of treat-
ment for patients with sexual deviations should be on prevention,
counseling, and medication,131 and has argued that the field of psychiatry
should “close down the practice [of GCS] everywhere.”132 Extending the
notion that the entire motivation for GCS is sexual arousal, his writings
repeatedly pair GCS with “[amputations of] the legs of patients who claim
to find sexual excitement in gazing at and exhibiting stumps of amputated
legs.”133 The amputation of limbs for sexual arousal violates “deep moral
convictions . . . about what is right or wrong,” “commandeers our think-
ing,” generates a “sense of outrage, disruption, and disorientation,” and
“trigger[s] a deep-seated response . . . that overrides traditional notions of
process and procedure.”134 Dr. McHugh’s rhetorical pairing of GCS and
erotically motivated limb amputations seems designed to elicit similar vis-
ceral revulsion and disgust towards GCS.135
of the transgender experience for the sake of providing a neat sexualized
explanation”).
131. See, e.g., Pathogenic Meme, supra note 120 (expressing the view that Caitlyn Jenner’s
“psychological serenity in the future is doubtful” because “his” doctors performed
GCS and other feminizing surgeries on “him,” instead of treating “him” properly,
with psychotherapy and medication).
132. Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
133. See, e.g., Surgical Sex, supra note 11 (expressing disappointment that foreign surgical
centers perform GCS and other surgeries requested by “patients with sexual devia-
tions,” including the “astonishing” leg amputation surgery).
134. STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX FAIRNESS AND FOLK JUSTICE 44 (2013) (quoting Steven
Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008, at 638). Moralization
is a psychological state that can be turned on and off like a switch, and when it is on,
a distinctive mind-set commandeers our thinking. This is the mind-set that makes us
deem actions immoral (“killing is wrong”) rather than merely disagreeable (“I hate
brussels sprouts”), unfashionable (“bell-bottoms are out”), or imprudent (“don’t
scratch mosquito bites”).
According to [the theory of moral mandates], individuals hold deep moral
convictions, which are subjective beliefs about what is right or wrong. The
broad moral categories identified by the anthropologists – and the sense of
outrage, disruption, and disorientation when they are violated – set the
background for individual moral convictions that people hold in their
lives. . . . [T]hey have to be “experienced as a psychologically nonnegotiable
and as a fundamental truth about right and wrong.” . . . [I]f an issue
touches directly on a moral mandate, it will trigger a deep-seated response –
drawing on our moral instincts and self-definition – that overrides tradi-
tional notions of process and procedure.
Id. at 44–45 (internal citations omitted).
135. Martha Nussbaum notes that “[d]isgust is like racial hatred: it does not always an-
nounce itself in polite company.” NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 26.
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Dr. McHugh’s influential yet controversial bioethical views on trans-
genderism and GCS featured prominently in the tax controversy between
O’Donnabhain and the IRS. One could even say that McHugh’s writings
on GCS—which of course say nothing about how the tax law defines “med-
ical care”—served as the IRS “playbook” in the ensuing tax litigation, not-
withstanding that the litigation should have centered narrowly on the
interpretation under existing tax law of the term “medical care” in § 213.
C. The Administrative Tax Controversy
During the 2002 IRS examination of O’Donnabhain’s 2001 tax re-
turn, the IRS examiner took the position that O’Donnabhain’s 2001 medi-
cal expenses were nondeductible cosmetic surgery expenses,136 not
deductible medical expenses, and asserted a $5,679 tax deficiency,137 $5,115
of which was attributable to the disallowance of medical expenses.138 Dur-
ing the next phase of the administrative tax controversy, in the Boston IRS
Office of Appeals,139 O’Donnabhain was represented by attorneys from Gay
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”). In November of 2004,
GLAD issued a press release about an anticipated resolution of the appeal in
favor of O’Donnabhain. (The IRS appeal still was pending at the time
GLAD issued the press release. The GLAD attorneys apparently understood
that the Appeals Officer would allow the deduction, but the IRS later re-
versed course and denied O’Donnabhain the deduction.) In the press re-
lease, GLAD attorney Karen Loewy stated that the IRS Appeals Officer’s
decision to allow O’Donnabhain the medical expense deduction “recognizes
that sex reassignment can be as medically necessary for some people as an
appendectomy or heart bypass surgery.”140
The GLAD press release prompted a firestorm of conservative back-
lash.141 In a December 2004 open letter to IRS Commissioner Mark
136. Kelley Winters, A Taxing Question of Medical Necessity, GID REFORM WEBLOG (Feb.
6, 2010), https://gidreform.wordpress.com/2010/02/06/a-taxing-question-of-medi-
cal-necessity/ (stating tax examiner denied O’Donnabhain’s 2001 medical expense
deduction on the grounds that GCS and hormonal treatment were “cosmetic”
expenses).
137. See also Alesdair H. Ittelson, Trapped in the Wrong Phraseology: O’Donnabhain v.
Commissioner – Consequences for Federal Tax Policy and the Transgender Community,
26:2 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 356, 358 (2011).
138. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72.
139. The Office of Appeals is part of the IRS and functions like a mediation service to
resolve tax controversies without litigation. Settlements made by Appeals Officers are
not made public.
140. See Phan, supra note 12.
141. Id. (describing public response of Traditional Values Coalition to the GLAD
announcement).
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Everson, the chairman of the Traditional Values Coalition (“TVC”), Rever-
end Louis Sheldon, demanded that the IRS reverse its position “[o]n behalf
of the 43,000 churches that are associated with the Traditional Values Coali-
tion.”142 Criticizing the “homo-trans” agenda as “a sure recipe for sexual
confusion and life-long despair,” Sheldon asserted that “[a] man can no
more become a woman than he can become a Dodge Minivan. A person
who thinks otherwise is delusional.”143 The Sheldon TVC letter asserted
that encouraging sex reassignment surgery is “collaborating with mad-
ness,”144 an expression Dr. McHugh used in his 2004 article, Surgical Sex,145
which appeared in the religiously affiliated publication First Things.146 Shel-
don warned Commissioner Everson that the decision of the IRS made it a
“pawn” in the “homosexual/transgender movement,” which advocates for
allowing individuals to determine their own gender identity.147 Conservative
Christian news outlets spread the word about the TVC letter to Everson.148
In February 2005, more than two dozen members of Congress wrote to
Commissioner Everson, expressing outrage about the decision of the IRS
Office of Appeals to allow the deduction, which they said “smacks in the
face of the law-abiding tax examiner” who classified the GCS and hormone
therapy expenses as nondeductible “cosmetic” expenses.149 The letter de-
manded that Everson explain the IRS decision.150 Both the TVC letter to
Commissioner Everson, which displays some of Dr. McHugh’s rhetoric,
and the subsequent letter that members of Congress sent to Commissioner
Everson express the moral outrage these groups felt about the IRS allowing
O’Donnabhain a medical expense deduction.
Several months later, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued Chief
Counsel Advice (the “CCA”) regarding the O’Donnabhain controversy.151
142. Id. (quoting TVC Chairman Sheldon’s letter of concern).
143. Id. (quoting TVC Chairman Sheldon’s letter of concern).
144. Id. (arguing “[t]he IRS is collaborating with madness by giving tax deductions for
unneeded ‘sex change’ operations”).
145. Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
146. See Masthead, FIRST THINGS, https://www.firstthings.com/masthead (last visited
Sept. 13, 2016) (“First Things is published by The Institute on Religion and Public
Life, an interreligious, nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is
to advance a religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society.”)
147. Phan, supra note 12.
148. See, e.g., id.
149. John McCaslin, Under the Beltway, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2005), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/16/20050216-123422-6559r/ (quoting
letter from congressmen: “[a]s members of the United States House of Representa-
tives, we view this as an outrage and believe it sets a precedent that both the IRS and
the American taxpayer at large will not be comfortable with”).
150. Id.
151. CCA, supra note 13.
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The CCA, citing Dr. McHugh’s article, Surgical Sex, concluded that
O’Donnabhain’s GCS and hormonal therapy expenses were nondeductible
cosmetic surgery expenses, not deductible medical expenses.152 The Office
of Chief Counsel also cited relevant federal income tax sources including
§ 213(d)(1)(A) and (d)(9)(A), Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e) (1), and
the legislative history of the 1990 cosmetic surgery amendment to §213.153
Construing the legislative history to create “strict” and very specific require-
ments for deducting the costs of medical procedures that alter appearance,
the CCA concludes:
[T]he taxpayer has not satisfactorily demonstrated that the ex-
penses incurred for the taxpayer’s [GCS] fit within the strict
boundaries for [a medical expense deduction]. There is nothing
to substantiate that these expenses were incurred to promote the
proper function of the taxpayer’s body and only incidentally af-
fect the taxpayer’s appearance. The expenses also were not in-
curred for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from a
congenital abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease (such
as reconstructive [breast] surgery following the removal of a
malignancy).154
152. Id. at 5.
153. See CCA, supra note 13, at 4; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
P.L. 101-508 § 11342(a), 104 Stat. 1388 § 11342(a) (amending § 213 to add
§ 213(d)(9), the cosmetic surgery exception, to the § 213(d)(1) definition of medi-
cal care). The cosmetic surgery exclusion was added to the bill in the Senate and the
Senate Report was printed in the Congressional Record (instead of being reported
separately). See CCA, supra note 13, at 4; see also 136 CONG. REC. S15629, S15711
(October 18, 1990). The CCA states that the Senate committee:
[D]etermined that expenses for cosmetic surgery should not be eligible for
the medical expense deduction absent certain circumstances clearly not pre-
sent in the case of [GCS] (i.e., a congenital abnormality, an accident or
trauma, or a disfiguring disease). The Senate Report states that expenses for
purely cosmetic procedures that are not medically necessary are, in essence,
voluntary personal expenditures, which like other personal expenditures
(e.g., food and clothing) generally should not be deductible in computing
taxable income. In discussing the types of surgery which are deemed to be
medically necessary, the Senate Report lists only: (1) procedures that are
medically necessary to promote the proper function of the body and which
only incidentally affect the patient’s appearance; and (2) procedures for
treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from a congenital abnormality,
personal injury, trauma, or disease (such as reconstructive surgery following
the removal of a malignancy). . . .
CCA, supra note 13, at 4.
154. CCA, supra note 13, at 5.
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Although the Benjamin standards of care are the consensus approach
among medical experts who diagnose and treat patients with gender identity
disorders,155 the Office of Chief Counsel expressed concern that the
question of “whether [GCS] is a treatment for an illness or disease is
controversial,” citing Dr. McHugh’s Surgical Sex article.156 The Office of the
Chief Counsel opined that the costs of GCS and hormone therapy could
not be deducted as medical expenses without an “unequivocal expression of
Congressional intent that expenses of this type qualify,” and concluded that
allowing such medical expense deductions without express authority “would
be moving beyond the generally accepted boundaries that define this type of
deduction.”157  The IRS Office of Appeals subsequently reversed course and
denied O’Donnabhain the medical expense deduction for the costs of the
GCS and hormone therapy.158
D. The Case in the United States Tax Court
In 2006, O’Donnabhain filed a petition in the United States Tax
Court to challenge the IRS classification of the disputed expenses and as-
155. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 286 (direct testimony of Dr. George Brown, ex-
plaining that the Benjamin standards of care are the international standard of care).
Dr. Brown notes that the goal of hormone treatment and GCS is to relieve the
complex of GID symptoms:
[W]e’re looking at changes in mood, changes in satisfaction with life, ability
to get beyond the symptoms that they had prior to the treatment that they
have received.
So, we’re looking at emotional, affective if you will, components as
well as things like employment . . . housing, family relationships, sexual
relationships.
Id. at 289.
156. CCA, supra note 13, at 5 (citing Surgical Sex, supra note 11) (emphasis added).
157. CCA, supra note 13, at 5:
To our knowledge, there is no case law, regulation, or revenue ruling that
specifically addresses medical expense deductions for GRS or similar proce-
dures. In light of the Congressional emphasis on denying a deduction for
procedures relating to appearance in all but a few circumstances and the
controversy surrounding whether GRS is a treatment for an illness or dis-
ease, the materials submitted do not support a deduction. Only an unequiv-
ocal expression of Congressional intent that expenses of this type qualify
under section 213 would justify the allowance of the deduction in this case.
Otherwise, it would seem we would be moving beyond the generally ac-
cepted boundaries that define this type of deduction).
Id.
158. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 96 (2010) (stating that IRS denied the
deduction).
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serted a tax deficiency of $5,679.159 The Tax Court trial before Judge Gale
began on July 24, 2007. The main legal issue concerned the statutory con-
struction of § 213(d)(1)(A) and (d)(9) and the application of § 213(d) to
the facts of the case.160 Some of the facts were hotly contested. For example,
the IRS argued that the GID diagnoses made by Ellaborn and Coleman
were a “sham” because: (1) Ellaborn and Coleman did not independently
verify what O’Donnabhain told them about her GID symptoms; (2) “pa-
tient deception” made such third-party corroboration of her symptoms “es-
sential” in the case; and (3) O’Donnabhain lied to them and manipulated
them.161 O’Donnabhain, Dianne Ellaborn, Dr. Coleman, and Dr. Meltzer
all testified as fact witnesses at the trial.162 Dr. Brown testified as an expert
witness and submitted an expert witness report on behalf of
O’Donnabhain.163 Dr. Dietz and Dr. Schmidt, both of whom were Dr.
McHugh’s colleagues at Johns Hopkins,164 testified and submitted expert
reports on behalf of the IRS. The trial briefs, transcript, and expert witness
reports total over 1,000 pages. Eight lawyers were listed on the IRS briefs165
and five lawyers were listed on O’Donnabhain’s briefs.166
1. The Parties’ Arguments
a. O’Donnabhain’s Arguments
O’Donnabhain argued that: (1) the § 213(d) term “disease” is con-
strued broadly and includes mental disorders;167 (2) GID is a “disease” ac-
cording to standard medical references, including the DSM-IV and
159. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 34.
160. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 34.
161. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 197–98, 201–02 (noting practice of
“patient deception” in GID cases, insisting that independent verification of
O’Donnabhain’s symptoms was “essential,” and arguing that “statements to her
evaluators were not forthright [and] in fact, they were a manipulation of her health
care providers”).
162. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 41–42.
163. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 41–42.
164. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 96 (Dr. McHugh was Dr. Schmidt’s
colleague at Johns Hopkins), 106, 155 (while Dr. Dietz was a resident at Johns
Hopkins, he was Dr. McHugh’s student).
165. IRS briefs lists Donald Korb (IRS Chief Counsel), Thomas Thomas, Frances Regan,
Maureen O’Brien, Mary Hamilton, John Mikalchus, Erika Cormier, and Molly
Donahue. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14.
166. O’Donnabhain was represented in the case by three attorneys from Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, Ben Klein, Karen Loewy, and Jennifer Levi, and two pro
bono attorneys, David Nagle and Amy Sheridan. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at
1–2.
167. See Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 51–52 n.10.
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standard psychiatric texts;168 (3) the mental health professionals who treated
O’Donnabhain were licensed to diagnose and treat mental health disorders
and were experts in gender disorders;169 (4) GCS and hormone therapy are
standard medical therapies that are widely accepted within the expert medi-
cal community as treatments for severe GID;170 (5) the medical procedures
undertaken by O’Donnabhain changed her functioning, not just her ap-
pearance;171 (6) neither GCS nor hormone therapy is § 213(d)(9) cosmetic
surgery because the procedures were undertaken for the purpose of relieving
the psychological distress and impairment caused by O’Donnabhain’s severe
GID to permit her to function more normally; and (7) the expenses were
incurred to affect the structure or function of her body.172 Quoting from
the Benjamin standards of care, O’Donnabhain asserted that GCS to treat
severe GID “is medically indicated and medically necessary. Sex reassign-
ment is not . . . ‘elective,’ ‘cosmetic,’ or optional in any meaningful sense. It
constitutes very effective and appropriate treatment for transsexualism or
profound GID.”173
O’Donnabhain argued that the feminizing hormones and GCS were
necessary for her to function and flourish. Medical transition reduces the
incongruence between a GID patient’s internal sense of gender and the pa-
tient’s body.174  The therapeutic goals of reducing this incongruence are (1)
168. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 283–84 (direct testimony of Dr. George Brown);
Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 6–7, 47.
169. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 12, 43–45.
170. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 284–85 (direct testimony of Dr. George Brown);
Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 12.
171. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 12 (surgery created “functioning,
sensate clitoris” and vaginal vault).
172. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 14–22 (Loewy’s opening statement on behalf of
Petitioner); id. at 70 (O’Donnabhain testimony that purpose of gender transition
medical procedure was “[n]ot for improving my appearance, but so that I would look
to the outside world that I was female”). Expert witness Dr. George Brown testified
that surgery may be important to pass “with intimate partners or going to a gym
using a locker room, and other places where you might have to be naked in public,
or an emergency room or a doctor’s office.” Id. at 424. See also Post-Trial Brief of
Petitioner, supra note 72, at 14, 45–46, 57 (The taxpayer’s “purpose was to alter her
body to bring it into conformity with her female gender identity so as to enable her
to fully function as a woman.”). Id. (emphasis added).
173. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 14.
174. The diagnostic criteria for GID under DSM-IV-TR include: (1) a strong and persis-
tent cross-gender identification; (2) persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense
of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex; (3) the absence of a biological
intersex condition; and (4) “clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 79.
DSM-5, which uses the term “gender dysphoria” instead of “gender identity disor-
der,” has similar diagnostic criteria, including “clinically significant distress or im-
pairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning,” but
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to reduce the patient’s clinical levels of internal psychological distress, and
(2) to reduce the patient’s functional impairments, including impairments
in social functioning.175 Transgender persons who transition thus have dual
goals, one of which is entirely internal and psychological, and the other of
which is to be able to function in their gender. O’Donnabhain had both
goals.176
The first goal of medical transition is to reduce the patient’s internal
distress. Persons with GID express the internal feeling of having a “birth
defect”177 or that they are “in the wrong body.”178 O’Donnabhain testified,
“I wanted my male body to go away.”179 The internal feelings of distress are
so intense that patients with GID sometimes attempt to castrate them-
selves.180 In addition, suicide rates for transgender persons are significantly
higher than for the general population.181 At trial, O’Donnabhain testified:
eliminates the designation of the condition as a “disorder.” DSM-5, supra note 79;
DSM-5 FACT SHEET, supra note 79 (“[G]ender nonconformity is not in itself a
mental disorder. The critical element of gender dysphoria is the presence of clinically
significant distress associated with the condition.”).
175. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 359–60 (cross examination of Dr. George Brown,
explaining that patients seek treatment to reduce conflicts with society and internal
psychological distress).
176. Id. at 70–71 (direct testimony of O’Donnabhain, explaining both her desire to func-
tion as a woman in public spaces and her desire to relieve her internal psychological
distress). See also Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 55–56
(O’Donnabhain’s “consistent purpose” was “to treat her GID and alleviate her clini-
cally significant distress and impairment by bringing her gender identity and her
body into conformity, and enabling her to live and function as the woman she is.”).
177. See, e.g., SUSIE ORBACH, BODIES 26 (2009) (stating that the genitals with which a
trans woman was born were a “life-threatening birth defect”).
178. See, e.g., Talia Bettcher, supra note 119, at 31, 63 (describing Jay Prosser’s argument
that “transsexuals appeal to the notion of the ‘wrong body’ because it simply feels
that way,” but rejecting the “wrong-body” theory because it assumes that gender is
innate).
179. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 62.
180. Report of Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. George R. Brown at 11, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 134 T.C. 34 (2010) (No. 6402-06) [hereinafter Brown Expert
Report] (stating that “[a]utocastration, autopenctomy, or impulses to perform geni-
tal self-surgery have been reported in patients who have not received appropriate
medical care for their GID”) .
181. ANNE P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION AND WILLIAMS
INST., UCLA SCH. OF L., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER AND GEN-
DER NON-CONFORMING ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY, (2014) [hereinafter TRANSGENDER SUICIDE ATTEMPTS].
The authors conclude:
Overall, the most striking finding of our analysis was the exceptionally high
prevalence of lifetime suicide attempts reported by [National Transgender
Discrimination Survey] respondents across all demographics and exper-
iences. Based on prior research and the findings of this report, we find that
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“If I didn’t have surgery . . . I would either be on drugs or an alcoholic, or I
would have killed myself. It’s as simple as that. There was no other way.”182
She sought out medical treatment of her GID to try to “end [the] pain that
[she] was in.”183 O’Donnabhain also undertook medical transition to be
able to approximate normal social functioning as a woman in public spaces
and in private.184
b. The IRS’s Arguments
The IRS asserted that an expense for a medical procedure is deductible
only if the procedure “treats” a “disease” and is not “cosmetic surgery or
other similar procedures.”185 The specific arguments made by the IRS
closely tracked Dr. McHugh’s writings on GID and GCS.
First, the IRS argued that GID is not a “disease.” Specifically, the IRS
argued that: (1) the term “disease” in § 213(d)(1)(A) is interpreted very
narrowly; (2) GID is not a “disease,” because “disease” requires a showing of
internal, biological (e.g., cellular) pathology and established disease etiol-
ogy;186 (3) GID is not a mental disorder because it is an individual’s deviant
sexual behavior or a conflict between the individual and society, not dys-
function within the individual;187 and (4) even if GID were a valid diagnosis
in some cases, the mental health professionals who treated O’Donnabhain
were incompetent, misguided, or biased.188
mental health factors and experiences of harassment, discrimination, vio-
lence and rejection may interact to produce a marked vulnerability to sui-
cidal behavior in transgender and gender non-conforming individuals.
Id. at 2.
182. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 65.
183. Id. at 58.
184. See Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 359.
185. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 147–54.
186. Id. at 161–62.
187. Id. at 171. According to the IRS, DSM-IV-TR provides that a mental disorder must
be “a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the
individual. Neither deviant sexual behavior . . . nor conflicts that are primarily be-
tween the individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict
is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.” Id. The IRS noted that DSM-IV-
TR, unlike earlier versions of the DSM, requires “clinically significant distress or
impairment” for a GID diagnosis. See id. at 174. Likening GID to homosexuality,
which at one time had a diagnostic code that was later removed from the DSM, the
IRS asserted that “social deviance in the absence of [internal biological] dysfunction is
not a mental disorder”; the desire to “pass” in the preferred gender role expresses a
need to reduce the conflict between society and non-gender-conforming individuals.
Id. at 174, 178 (emphasis added). The IRS thus questioned whether GID is a mental
disorder at all.
188. Reply Brief for Respondent, at 48, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010)
(No. 6402-06) [hereinafter Respondent’s Reply Brief] (arguing “incompetence of
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The IRS impugned the credibility of O’Donnabhain, and the compe-
tence and credibility of the licensed mental health professionals who treated
her, O’Donnabhain’s expert witness, and the 350 members of WPATH
(who periodically revise the Benjamin standards of care for GID).189 For
example, IRS attorney Hamilton, in her cross-examination of Dr. Alex
Coleman (the Ph.D. psychologist who provided the GCS second opinion)
asked the witness a series of questions ending with “so, you are trans-
gender?” Coleman responded, “Yes.”190 Hamilton argued that Dr. Cole-
man’s transgender status “goes to his bias.”191 In its briefs, the IRS also
asserted that: (1) Dr. Brown was biased by his desire to collect insurance
reimbursement for GID treatment;192 (2) O’Donnabhain’s GID diagnosis
by Diane Ellaborn and Dr. Alex Coleman was a “sham”;193 and (3) Dr.
Coleman was biased “as a transgender person who was previously a
woman.”194
The IRS attacked O’Donnabhain as well, asserting that she deceived
and manipulated her health care providers to obtain GCS.195 The IRS also
argued that she “misrepresented her medical condition to the court”196 and
was not credible because she gave interviews about her case and allowed
GLAD to publicize her case, yet sought a protective order to prevent her
contact information and home address from being disclosed to the
public.197
In addition to attacking O’Donnabhain and her witnesses, the IRS
challenged the professional credibility of WPATH. According to the IRS,
WPATH “purports to be a professional organization devoted to the
Ellaborn and Coleman” resulted in “unprofessional” treatment of taxpayer and as-
serting that Dr. Brown was biased).
189. Although the IRS expressed skepticism about the taxpayer’s diagnosis, noting that
Diane Ellaborn, LICSW, and Alex Coleman, Ph.D., are not “medical” doctors, both
Ellaborn and Coleman are professionally licensed to diagnose and treat mental health
disorders. See, e.g., Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 28 (Ellaborn has
been fully licensed “to diagnose and treat psychiatric illnesses” since 1980), 34 (Cole-
man “is a licensed psychologist who specializes in working with clients with gender
identity issues.”).
190. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 224–25.
191. Id. at 224. Hamilton also questioned whether Dr. Coleman had complied with pro-
fessional recording-keeping requirements. Id. at 226–28.
192. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 193–94.
193. Id. at 197–98.
194. Id. at 200.
195. Id. at 200–01.
196. Id. at 206–07. The IRS argued that O’Donnabhain’s testimony about her psycho-
logical distress and impairment was inconsistent with the fact that she was “high
functioning” before her surgery (she had a job and waited several years to have GCS,
until her children were older). See id.
197. Id. at 207.
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understanding and treatment of gender identity disorders.”198 Furthermore,
the IRS argued that the Benjamin standards of care make mental health
professionals the “gatekeepers” for access to medical gender transition,
which furthers the financial interests of WPATH members.199 The IRS also
asserted that “GID was added to the DSM by way of a process that was
devoid of scientific rigor,” to allow GID patients and mental health profes-
sionals to seek reimbursement of GID treatment expenses by insurance
companies.200
In a bizarre twist, the IRS went so far as to suggest that
O’Donnabhain was misdiagnosed and “may have suffered from transvestic
fetishism” or “autogynephilia,”201 instead of GID, parroting Dr. McHugh’s
controversial, categorical views on autogynephilia.202 Based on its new diag-
nosis of O’Donnabhain, the IRS concluded that GCS and hormones were
not appropriate forms of treatment for her.203
Second, the IRS argued that all of O’Donnabhain’s medical proce-
dures, including hormone treatment and GCS, were § 213(d)(9) “cosmetic
surgery or other similar procedures” because: (1) O’Donnabhain undertook
all of the procedures “to improve her appearance”;204 (2) hormone therapy
and GCS do not “meaningfully promote the proper function of the body”
and “prevent or treat illness or disease”;205 (3) O’Donnabhain did not have a
198. Id. at 29–30 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 31. The IRS argued that WPATH members “have a financial and professional
interest in maintaining the legitimacy of GID as a mental disorder and GCS as its
treatment.” Id. at 143. In the United States, plastic surgeons will not perform GCS
without mental health professionals’ letters of recommendation, which are required
by the Benjamin standards of care. Id. at 33.
200. See id. at 135.
201. Id. at 27–28 (arguing that “petitioner may have suffered from transvestic fetishism,”
not GID, and autogynephilia “may link transvestic fetishism with non-homosexual
forms of GID”); see also Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 391–92 (IRS questioning
Dr. Brown about connection between transvestic fetishism, autogynephila, and
GID).
202. See Surgical Sex, supra note 11 (People assigned male at birth who have lived as men
in their adult lives and transition late in life have autogynephilia and undertake
medical transition “to add more versimilitude to their [sexually arousing]
costumes.”).
203. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 27 (arguing that “petitioner may have
suffered from transvestic fetishism,” “gender dysphoria of transvestites is due to de-
pression and should be treated through psychotherapy,” not hormonal treatment and
“needless, irreversible surgery, which would provoke further suffering in these troub-
led individuals”).
204. Respondent’s Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 41 (O’Donnabhain “chose to treat her
mental disorder by changing her physical appearance from male to female.”).
205. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 180–81.
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deformity or disfiguring disease;206 (4) feminizing hormone therapy and
GCS are not within the narrow exception described in the 1990 legislative
history of the cosmetic surgery amendment;207 and (5) the medical proce-
dures were not “medically necessary.”208 The IRS also argued that the cos-
metic surgery amendment limits all of the § 213(d)(1)(A) definition of
medical care, not just the “structure or function” part of the definition.209
Under this interpretation of the statute, a medical procedure that changes
appearance is not medical care, even if the medical procedure has a thera-
peutic effect (i.e., it reduces dysfunction).
Third, the IRS asserted that the feminizing hormones and GCS did
not “treat” GID because the procedures were not efficacious.210 The IRS
argued that a taxpayer cannot deduct the cost of a medical procedure unless
the taxpayer can establish that the procedure was efficacious.211 At trial, the
IRS asserted that GCS “doesn’t change the patient’s belief that their psycho-
logical gender doesn’t match their biological sex.”212 Taking a page from Dr.
McHugh’s playbook,213 the IRS argued that a doctor would not give li-
posuction to a patient with anorexia and questioned whether the alteration
of a patient’s body ever can be efficacious treatment for a psychiatric
disorder:214
206. Respondent’s Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 41 (“petitioner stipulated that she did
not have a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a
personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease”).
207. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 147–153 (arguing that breast recon-
struction after cancer treatment is within the exception in the cosmetic surgery
amendment legislative history, but O’Donnabhain’s GCS and hormone treatments
were not because they were directed at improving her appearance).
208. Id. at 181–86.
209. Respondent’s Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 40–41.
210. Id. at 66, 48 (hormone treatment and GCS were “not curative”).
211. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 32 (arguing GCS is not medical care because it is
not “meaningful treatment” of GID).
212. Id. at 388 (Mikalchus cross-examination of Dr. Brown).
213. Surgical Sex, supra note 11.
214. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 417–18 (Mikalchus cross-examination of Dr.
Brown, during which Mikalchus asked Dr. Brown whether he agreed that GID “is
the only psychiatric disorder in which the alleged treatment reinforces the core symp-
tom of the disorder,” followed by “You wouldn’t recommend liposuction for some-
body who is anorexic; would you?”). See also id. at 420 (During cross-examination,
Dr. Brown testified that post-surgical transgender persons “no longer have a body
[that] they loathe because they have had an alignment of their body to match their
psychological sex. . . . We can’t operate on the brain and change the brain. So, we are
operating on the body.”); Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 102–03
(stating that “SRS cannot cure GID” and observing it was Dr. Brown’s opinion that
a doctors do not prescribe liposuction for anorexic patients), 144 (“SRS does not
cure GID, because SRS does not change a person’s underlying belief that his or her
psychological gender does not match their biological sex.”).
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In the case of GID, mental health professionals eschew the ca-
pacity to treat the patient’s mind, and instead refer the patient
for surgery to alter the body so that it is in conformity with the
patient’s mind. Thus [GCS] only reinforces the patient’s cross-
gender identification in their mind, by changing their physical
appearance to that of the opposite gender.
[GCS] cannot cure GID, since GID patients will continue
to experience a strong and consistent cross-gender identification
even after the surgery.215
In addition to making a categorical argument that feminizing hormones and
GCS cannot be efficacious treatment of GID, the IRS asserted that the
procedures in fact were not “efficacious” in O’Donnabhain’s case because
they did not cure her “depression and other mental problems.”216
2. The Decision and Opinions
The Tax Court decision and opinion in the case were issued on Febru-
ary 2, 2010, almost two years after the last trial documents were filed by the
parties.217 The O’Donnabhain opinion was a “reviewed” opinion, with six-
teen Tax Court judges participating on the panel.218 The majority opinion,
written by Judge Gale,219 held that the costs of the hormone therapy and
GCS were deductible medical expenses,220 but the costs of the breast aug-
mentation were nondeductible cosmetic surgery expenses.221 Specifically,
the majority concluded that: (1) GID is a “disease” (in part based on the
DSM-IV-TR classification of GID);222 (2) hormone therapy and GCS are
medically accepted—albeit controversial—“treatments” for severe GID;223
(3) O’Donnabhain’s breast augmentation was “cosmetic surgery” because it
215. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 191–92.
216. Id. at 147 (“Even assuming [O’Donnabhain] had GID, [GCS] and feminizing hor-
mones did not cure or mitigate her GID. Clearly, [GCS] and cross-gender hormones
were not effective treatments for petitioner’s depression and other mental
problems.”). See also id. at 73–78 (The IRS emphasized that important aspects of the
taxpayer’s life deteriorated after her transition; she lost her engineering job in 2003
and was still unemployed in 2007, and she became so depressed that she required
medical treatment for depression.).
217. Press Release, GLAD, GLAD Wins Case vs IRS on Sex Reassignment Deductions
(Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.glad.org/current/press-release/glad-wins-case-vs-irs-on-
sex-reassignment-deductions.
218. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35, 77.
219. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35.
220. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 77.
221. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 73.
222. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 59–63.
223. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70.
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improved her appearance, and she failed to show that the breast surgery
“treated” her GID under the Benjamin standards of care;224 and (4) the
court did not have to decide whether § 213 requires a showing of medical
necessity, because O’Donnabhain demonstrated the medical necessity of the
treatment she received.225
Judge Halpern, concurring, interpreted the language of § 213(d)(9) to
classify a medical procedure as “cosmetic” only if meets three requirements:
(1) it “is directed at improving appearance”; and (2) “it does not meaning-
fully promote the proper function of the body”; and (3) it “does not prevent
or treat illness or disease.”226 Under this approach, he concluded that the
hormone therapy and GCS were not “cosmetic,” because they reduced the
symptoms of GID and thus “treated” the disease.227 Judge Holmes, sepa-
rately concurring, concluded that O’Donnabhain’s hormone treatment and
GCS were not “cosmetic” because (1) they “treated” GID and (2) created
an entirely new appearance, instead of improving O’Donnabhain’s old ap-
pearance.228  Judge Holmes also opined that § 213 does not require a show-
ing of medical necessity and criticized the majority’s “overreach in finding
[GCS] medically necessary.”229 Judge Goeke, also separately concurring,
concluded that (1) the GCS was not “cosmetic,” because O’Donnabhain
undertook the GCS to alter her functioning—not her appearance;230 but (2)
the breast surgery was “cosmetic,” because surgery “on healthy tissue” is
always cosmetic, even if it is undertaken to relieve extreme mental
distress.231
224. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 72–73.
225. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 74–76.
226. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 83–84 (Halpern, J., concurring).
227. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 84.
228. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 99–100 (Holmes, J., concurring, joined by Goeke, J.)
(Judge Holmes concluded that the breast augmentation was “cosmetic” because it
was undertaken to improve the taxpayer’s new female appearance).
229. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 97 (Holmes, J., concurring). Judge Holmes expressed
concern that the “medical necessity” of GCS is much more controversial than the
majority acknowledges. Id. at 93–95 (defending Dr. Schmidt and Dr. McHugh and
noting that university-based clinics stopped performing GCS in the 1980s, following
the closure of the Johns Hopkins clinic). Also, he observed that the majority’s legal
finding—that GCS is medically necessary—potentially has significant implications
beyond tax law, for example in Eigth Amendment prisoner’s rights cases, cases in-
volving GCS exclusions in employer-provided health care plans, and cases involving
Medicare and Medicaid exclusions for GCS. Id. at 92–97. These cases center on
whether a third party (a prison, a health insurer, Medicare, or Medicaid) must fund
costly GCS for a person with severe GID.
230. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 101 (Goeke, J., concurring, joined by Holmes J.).
231. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 103 (Goeke, J., concurring). Judge Goeke opined that
“physically altering a patient’s appearance to relieve extreme mental distress” is al-
ways “cosmetic.” Id. In his view, a procedure is undertaken to relieve mental distress
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Judges Foley, Gustafson, Kroupa, Vasquez, and Wells concurred re-
garding the nondeductiblity of the breast augmentation surgery, but dis-
sented regarding the deductibility of the hormone therapy and GCS
costs.232 Judge Foley, dissenting, interpreted § 213(d)(9) to mean that a
medical procedure directed at improving appearance is “cosmetic” unless
the procedure “meaningfully promotes the proper function of the body,”
and prevents or treats illness or disease.233 Under his reading of the statute, a
procedure can be “cosmetic” even if it was undertaken to treat a disease.234
Judge Gustafson, dissenting separately,235 concluded that GCS did not
“treat” O’Donnabhain’s disease:236
A procedure that changes the patient’s healthy male body (in
fact, that disables his healthy male body) and leaves his mind
unchanged (i.e., with the continuing misperception that he is
female) has not treated his mental disease. On the contrary, that
procedure has given up on the mental disease, has capitulated to
the mental disease, has arguably even changed sides and joined
forces with the mental disease.237
Judge Gustafson’s dissent is consistent with Dr. McHugh’s “collaborating
with madness” argument against GCS. Although Judge Gustafson expressed
if the tissue on which the procedure is performed is “healthy tissue.” Id. On the
other hand, a medical expense deduction is allowed for plastic surgery “to correct
physical maladies resulting from disease [i.e., malignancy] or disfigurement, as op-
posed to cosmetic surgery on healthy tissue.” Id. He suggested a bright-line classifica-
tion rule to avoid difficult line-drawing problems in classifying plastic surgeries and
similar procedures because “[t]he nuances of feminine appearances are virtually with-
out bounds and expenses for efforts to conform petitioner’s entire body to a femi-
nine ideal are indistinguishable from excluded expenses regardless of petitioner’s
mental health.” Id.
232. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 104, 109, 122.
233. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 105 (Foley, J., dissenting).
234. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 105–06.
235. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 109, 122.
236. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 110 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) Judge Gustafson agreed
with the majority regarding the following conclusions: O’Donnabhain suffered from
GID, which “is a serious mental condition”; certain medical professional groups in
good faith approve of GCS for patients with severe GID; and the taxpayer’s health
care professionals followed “prevailing standards of care.” Id. He disagreed, however,
with the majority’s conclusion that the GCS “treated” the taxpayer’s disease. In his
view, a procedure that changes a patient’s body without altering the patient’s mental
disease does not “treat” the patient’s disease; a procedure that merely reduces the
effects of disease is “mitigation” not “treatment” of disease. Id. at 122. Based on the
DSM characterization of GID as a mental disorder, he concludes that GCS did not
“treat” the taxpayer’s disease. Id.
237. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 122.
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concern about the “startling” surgical procedures at issue in the case, he
conceded in his dissent that “neither the tax collector nor the Tax Court
passes judgment on the ethics of legal medical procedures, since otherwise
deductible medical expenses are not rendered non-deductible on ethical
grounds.”238
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE IRS’S § 213 ARGUMENTS
This Part critiques three specific aspects of the IRS’s arguments in the
O’Donnabhain case: (1) the IRS’s extremely narrow construction of the
§ 213 (d)(1)(A) term “disease”; (2) the IRS’s extremely broad construction
of the § 213(d)(9) cosmetic surgery exception to the §213(d)(1)(A) defini-
tion of medical care; and (3) the IRS’s assertion that taxpayers must prove
additional requirements to deduct the costs of medical care, including (a)
the “medical necessity” of the care; and (b) the “efficacy” of the care. In
addition, this Part critiques the IRS’s arguments in the case, taken as a
whole, and voices concerns about the IRS’s treatment of O’Donnabhain
and other transgender persons.
A. Defining “Disease”
Consistent with Dr. McHugh’s views, the IRS argued that GID is not
a disease.239 In a significant departure from decades of case law and IRS
administrative practice,240 the IRS advocated for a very narrow construction
of the term “disease” in the O’Donnabhain case. This narrow construction
of disease is consistent with Dr. McHugh’s writings on the “medicalization”
of mental health disorders, in which Dr. McHugh advocates for a narrow
definition of disease. Specifically, the IRS argued that the § 213(d)(1)(A)
term “disease” should be construed to require taxpayer proof of a scientifi-
cally established disease pathology or etiology within the individual, and
“abnormal structure or function of the body at the gross, microscopic, mo-
lecular, biochemical, or neuro-chemical levels.”241 This interpretation would
exclude from the definition of “disease” injuries, physical and mental
238. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 110 (citation omitted) (noting, as an example, that the
cost of a legal abortion is deductible despite ethical controversy about abortion).
239. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 153–54 (Although the IRS conceded
that the Tax Court has held that “mental disorders can be diseases,” the IRS argued
that GID is not a disease.).
240. See Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23 (courts and the IRS have interpreted “medical
care” broadly).
241. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 160 (Dietz testimony).
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conditions, and disorders for which internal disease pathology and etiology
have not been established.242
The IRS proffered the testimony and report of its expert witness, Dr.
Dietz, in support of its extremely narrow, technical interpretation of
the term “disease.”243 The IRS argued: (1) “there is no known organic
pathology for GID”;244 (2) there is no scientific consensus that GID has a
biological basis;245 and (3) “there is no scientific evidence of a genetic or
congenital abnormality associated with GID.”246 The IRS argued that GID
was listed in the DSM “without any compelling evidence.”247
Consistent with Dr. McHugh’s view that GID is a type of deviant
behavior, not a disease, the IRS took the position that “the DSM-IV in-
cludes many non-diseases which are merely undesirable behavior pat-
terns.”248 In his testimony and expert report, Dr. Dietz used his narrow
definition of “disease” to classify as non-diseases various DSM disorders,
including: post-traumatic stress disorder;249 obsessive compulsive personality
disorder;250 pathological gambling;251 intermittent explosive disorder;252 im-
pulse control disorder;253 factitious disorders and Munchausen’s Syn-
drome;254 conduct disorder;255 oppositional defiant disorder;256 alcohol
abuse;257 adjustment disorders;258 and a broad array of paraphilias, including
242. Id. at 160–61 (distinguishing between “disease,” “illness,” and “disorder”).
243. Id. at 160. During his testimony, Dr. Dietz expressed his views on defining disease:
“To be a disease, a condition must arise as a result of a pathological process. . . . [I]t
is necessary that the pathology occur within the individual and reflect abnormal
structure or function of the body at the gross, microscopic, molecular, biochemical,
or neurochemical levels.”
244. Id. at 161.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 97 (referring to testimony of Dr. Schmidt).
247. Id. at 167.
248. Id. at 165 (listing exhibitionism, fetishism, transvetic fetishism, voyeurism, and sub-
stance abuse as examples of mental disorders that are undesirable behavior patterns,
but not diseases).
249. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 849 (Dietz testimony) (PTSD is an “injury,” not a
“disease”).
250. Id. at 860 (obsessive compulsive personality disorder is a “personality style” and “set
of habits” that are “within the voluntary control of the person,” not “reflecting any
pathology”).
251. Id. at 862 (pathological gambling is undesirable behavior and choices, not disease).
252. Id. at 866 (not a disease and “[t]here is no such thing in my view”).
253. Id. at 867.
254. Id. at 868–71 (“it’s purposeful and intentional behavior” and “a choice patients
make,” not a disease).
255. Id. at 874.
256. Id. at 875.
257. Id. at 878.
258. Id. at 889.
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exhibitionism, fetishism, frotteurism, pedophilia, sexual masochism, sexual
sadism, transvestic fetishism, and voyeurism.259 Conversely, he classified as
“diseases” obsessive compulsive disorder,260 major depressive disorder,261
and Asperger’s disorder.262
Dr. Dietz appeared in the case to provide expert witness testimony
and to defend an expert report on the meaning of “disease” and classifica-
tion of mental disorders as “diseases” or non-diseases.263 Nevertheless, he
was unsure of the classification of many of the disorders about which
O’Donnabhain’s lawyers inquired during the trial. For example, upon ques-
tioning, Dr. Dietz equivocated about the disease/non-disease classification
of the following disorders: anorexia nervosa;264 bulimia nervosa;265 panic
disorder with agoraphobia;266 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder;267 sep-
aration anxiety disorder;268 mutism;269 alcohol dependence;270 dysthymic
disorder (low-level depression); personality disorders;271 and fibromyalgia.272
Several aspects of the IRS’s argument about interpreting “disease” nar-
rowly are noteworthy. First, the IRS’s expert witness, Dr. Dietz, is a forensic
psychiatrist who famously has testified as a government witness in high-
profile criminal cases, to assert that a criminal defendant’s alleged mental
disorder does not absolve the defendant of criminal responsibility for hei-
nous actions.273 A large font heading on the home page of the Park Dietz &
Associates website says “WE KNOW CRIME” and prominently features
photographs of some of America’s most notorious serial killers, against
259. Expert Report of Dr. Park Dietz for Respondent, at 18, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r,
134 T.C. 34 (2010) (No. 6402-06) [hereinafter Dietz Expert Report].
260. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 854–56 (Dietz testimony).
261. Id. at 887.
262. Id. at 891 (first noting that he would label it a “congenital defect or a congenital
abnormality rather than a disease,” but later concluding that it is within his defini-
tion of disease because it has “a pathological and physical basis”).
263. Dietz Expert Report, supra note 259, at 7.
264. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 829–32 (Dietz testimony).
265. Id. at 832–36.
266. Id. at 842–46.
267. Id. at 873–74.
268. Id. at 876.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 878.
271. Id. at 889.
272. Id. at 890–91.
273. See id. at 798 (describing numerous criminal trials at which Dr. Dietz testified, to
hold a criminal defendant responsible for heinous conduct). See also Respondent’s
Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 107–08 (cases in which Dr. Dietz has testified
involve “murders, serial murders, sexual abuse and rape claims . . . and civil commit-
ment of sex offenders and mental patients”).
358 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:313
whom Dr. Dietz testified.274 “Half or more” of Dr. Dietz’s work as a foren-
sic psychiatrist has been in cases involving violent behavior.275 In his testi-
mony, Dr. Dietz explained that the duty of a forensic psychiatrist is to
question and challenge testimony about alleged mental disorders.276 In this
professional context, he construes the term “disease” very narrowly, to
require a criminal defendant to establish a disease pathology or etiology to
escape responsibility for criminal conduct.277
In the civil tax context of the O’Donnabhain case, Dr. Dietz applied
the same narrow construction of the term “disease.” During the trial,
O’Donnabhain’s lawyer asked Dr. Dietz whether the opinions he expressed
in his expert report about the definition of “disease” were specific to § 213
or were generic.278 Dietz replied: “I wasn’t trying to interpret the tax code.
But I was trying to address the language used in the tax code [the
§ 213(d)(1)A) term “disease”] in a generic way.”279 According to Dietz, the
IRS instructed him to address his expert opinion to the question of
“whether transsexualism or [GID] is a disease or illness.”280 Although he
testified that he was familiar with the language in § 213,281 Dietz seemed
unaware of the consistently broad IRS and judicial construction of the term
“disease,” which encompasses physical and mental conditions, disorders, in-
juries, and congenital defects. For example, he assumed that his narrow defi-
nition of “disease” would not preclude a medical expense deduction for a
taxpayer who had an “injury” but not a “disease.”282 Moreover, contrary to
the IRS “disease” argument for which he was providing expert testimony, he
testified: “It looks to me as though, in general, the IRS presumes that when
doctors . . . try to minister treatments to patients to make them bet-
ter . . . that it is generally deductible without anyone scrutinizing whether it
is a disease or not.”283
Consistent with the views of his teacher, Dr. McHugh, Dietz’s expert
report includes a polemic on the “medicalization” of undesirable behaviors
274. PARK DIETZ & ASSOCIATES, http://www.parkdietzassociates.com/ (last visited Mar.
19, 2016).
275. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 803 (Dietz testimony).
276. See id. at 797–98.
277. Id. at 923–24. Judge Gale asked Dr. Dietz “what is the purpose of attaching or
withholding your label of disease on a mental disorder in the DSM?” Dr. Dietz
responded that, in his forensic psychiatric practice, a narrow definition of disease is
necessary to make people who are accused of crimes—but claim mental incompe-
tence or insanity—accountable for their behavior. Id.
278. Id. at 835.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 825.
281. Id. at 834–35, 881–82.
282. See id. at 849–50 (“I assume treatment of injuries is deductible.”).
283. Id. at 857–58.
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and non-disease conditions.284 Throughout his report and testimony, Dr.
Dietz used words and expressions that highlighted his professional inclina-
tion to hold persons “accountable” for their “bad behavior” by discounting
their mental disorders.285 His critical frame of reference might be under-
standable in the criminal context, within which Dr. Dietz testifies against
criminal defendants, but makes no sense in the context of interpreting
§ 213. When Judge Gale asked Dr. Dietz whether his work on the topics of
sexuality and gender generally pertained to matters of criminal liability, Dr.
Dietz replied:
[F]ar more of my experience concerns the conditions known as
[sexual] paraphilias that often come in conflict with the law. And
more of my experience is among those who already have come in
conflict with the law than those who have the same condition,
but haven’t offended or been caught for offending. Then, to a
lesser degree . . . I have experience with the other range of
human sexual problems, including sexual dysfunctions and gen-
der identity problems and sexual orientation issues.286
Judge Gale also inquired about Dr. Dietz’s qualifications as an expert
on GID and human sexuality and the basis for Dr. Dietz’s opinions in his
expert report.287 Dr. Dietz conceded that he did not evaluate or treat pa-
tients with GID,288 but said that he knew more about GID than the average
psychiatrist by virtue of working at Johns Hopkins, where transgender per-
sons were treated, and by virtue of reading the “literature” on GID:289 “I’m
aware of the search for causation. I’m aware of the professional controversies
284. O’Donnabhain’s lawyers objected to this portion of the Dietz expert report on the
grounds that Dr. Dietz is not an expert in philosophy. Id. at 810–11 (Dietz testi-
mony). Judge Gale’s response was to admit the entire report, but also assess the
weight it should be given. Id. at 816.
285. See, e.g., id. at 867 (Dietz testimony). When asked whether the diagnoses under the
heading of “impulse control disorders” are taught in medical schools, Dr. Dietz testi-
fied, “I don’t know if taught is the right thing so much as made fun of.” When asked
whether patients who are diagnosed with impulse control disorders receive treatment
for their disorder, Dr. Dietz replied, “Once they get caught.” Id. See also Respon-
dent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 118. According to Dietz, if society did not
distinguish between diseases and non-diseases, “we would lose all accountability for
human behavior.” Id. (emphasis added). Also he expressed the opinion that “if all
bad habits and maladaptive behavior are considered diseases, it becomes difficult to
think clearly as a society about human autonomy and human accountability.” Id.
(emphasis added).
286. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 819–20 (Dietz testimony).
287. Id. at 819–21.
288. Id. at 819.
289. Id. at 819–20.
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that have always surrounded the concept.”290 Dr. Dietz had not published
papers on the classification of diseases,291 but had published papers on the
narrower topic of classification of “certain paraphilias.”292
The second noteworthy aspect of the IRS “disease” argument in the
O’Donnabhain case is that severely narrowing the definition of disease, to
require a showing of internal cellular pathology, is antithetical to recent
federal and state legislation that was enacted to achieve parity between treat-
ment of mental health disorders (including substance abuse disorders) and
treatment of other types of disorders.293 In addition, the Affordable Care
Act “defined coverage of mental health and substance abuse treatment as
one of the ten essential health benefits,” thus mandating coverage for treat-
ment of mental health disorders, including substance abuse disorders.294
States also have enacted mental health parity statutes, some of which are
even stricter than the federal statutes.295
The third noteworthy aspect of the IRS “disease” argument in the
O’Donnabhain case is the IRS’s radical departure from decades of settled
case law and IRS administrative practice.  Both courts and the IRS consist-
ently have construed the § 213(d)(1)(A) term “disease” broadly to include
physical and mental conditions, injuries, and disorders, even following the
amendment of § 213(d) in 1990.296 Until the O’Donnabhain trial, the IRS
290. Id. at 820 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 817–18.
292. Id. at 812 (Dr. Dietz’s “contributions to the literature [are on] the classification of
certain paraphilias.”).
293. Sarah Goodell, Health Policy Brief: Mental Health Parity, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=112
(describing recently enacted federal mental-health-parity statutes, including the
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Eq-
uity Act of 1998).
294. See id.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) applied the [Mental Health Parity and Ad-
diction Equity Act] to issuers in the individual market and qualified health
plans offered through an exchange or marketplace, including the small busi-
ness exchange . . . . Importantly, the ACA defined coverage of mental
health and substance use treatment as one of the ten essential health bene-
fits (EHBs). As a result, all health insurance plans in the individual and
small-employer market—both inside and outside Marketplaces—must in-
clude coverage for the treatment of mental health and substance use disor-
ders. In this way, the ACA went beyond the MHPAEA by mandating
coverage rather than requiring parity only if coverage is provided.
Id.
295. Id. (“In the decade after the passage of the [Mental Health Parity Act], many states
passed their own mental health parity laws, some going further than the MHPA
toward full parity”).
296. See Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23.
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had not narrowly construed the term “disease” or asserted that taxpayers
claiming the deduction are required to prove internal disease pathology or
etiology. Such a narrow, hyper-technical approach is insupportable in the
context of interpreting § 213, particularly when a taxpayer incurs costs for
procedures that are inherently medical.
For decades, the IRS has classified expenses for inherently medical pro-
cedures (i.e., for procedures that are recommended by health care profes-
sionals and are medical in nature, including fees for doctors’ services,
hospital charges, fees for diagnostic tests, surgical fees, or prescription drugs)
as medical expenses.297 In contrast, the IRS has been more inclined to chal-
lenge taxpayers’ classification of personal expenses that are not inherently
medical (e.g., the cost of a pool, vacation, or gym membership) as deductible
medical care. Oddly, in the O’Donnabhain case, the IRS cites cases involv-
ing expenses that are not inherently medical (including cases involving the
cost of lawn care and the cost of transportation to play golf) for the proposi-
tion that O’Donnabhain cannot deduct the cost of inherently medical proce-
dures—prescription hormones and surgery—both undertaken on the advice
of multiple licensed mental health and medical professionals.298
The IRS “disease” argument also failed to fully address the
§ 213(d)(1)(A) core concept of functioning. The narrow “disease” defini-
tion offered by the IRS in the O’Donnabhain case inexplicably construed
functioning to involve only internal, biological functioning—and failed to
address the effects of GCS on psychological functioning, sexual functioning,
and social functioning. GCS fundamentally alters intimate sexual function-
ing. GCS also makes it more likely that a transgender person can perform
activities of daily living and have positive relationships and other requisites
for human flourishing.299 By failing to consider how difficult daily life can
be for transgender persons, the IRS failed to comprehend how important
GCS can be for functioning.
Functioning in a world with rigid binary gender classification creates
particularly daunting challenges for transgender persons. Societal norms
generally impose a rigid gender classification system, presenting only the
binary choice between a male or female gender classification, with a focus
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (“Payments for the following are payments for medi-
cal care: hospital services, nursing services . . . , medical, laboratory, surgical, dental,
and other diagnostic and healing services, X-rays, medicine and drugs . . . , artificial
teeth or limbs, and ambulance hire.”). The description of certain expenses as “inher-
ently medical” derives from cases interpreting § 213(d)(1)(A). See, e.g., Huff v.
Comm’r, 1995 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 200 (1995) (surgical expense is “inherently
medical”.).
298. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 206.
299. See, e.g., MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, FLOURISH: A VISIONARY NEW UNDERSTANDING
OF HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING 238–39 (2011).
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on natal sex, chromosomes, and anatomical differences.300 The entrenched
body-focused system segregates genders in many spaces: public restrooms,
locker rooms, schools, TSA airport screening areas, and homeless shelters.301
Identification documents, including birth certificates, drivers’ licenses, and
passports all specify a person’s gender to allow enforcement of gender spe-
cific classification rules.302 Where a person’s biological markers (including
anatomy and chromosomes) are consistent with internally perceived gender,
as is typically the case, this body-focused, binary system seems unremark-
able. For gender-nonconforming individuals, however, this rigid binary clas-
sification system creates ever-present challenges and threats—including
threats of bullying, humiliation, marginalization, discrimination, detention,
arrest, sexual violence, and other forms of violence.303
Marginalization of transgender persons begins at an early age, in
school, and continuing into adulthood.304 As adults, transgender persons are
disproportionately likely to face discrimination in employment305 and hous-
ing,306 and thus face increased risk of being unemployed and homeless.307
The pervasive inability to find traditional employment drives transgender
persons into illegal, underground forms of employment, including sex work,
which further exposes transgender persons to physical risks, including the
risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases.308 Compared to persons
who are not transgender (“cisgender” persons), transgender persons are sig-
nificantly more likely to be the victims of sexual violence and other forms of
violence.309
300. E.g. Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation
of Gender and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, 19 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC.
POL’Y 65 (2013) (reporting that seventy percent of transgender and gender noncon-
forming survey respondents were denied access to gendered public restrooms or
experienced “verbal harassment, and/or physical assault when trying to access or
while using gendered public restrooms”).
301. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 731, 751 (2008)
(noting that many necessary or mandatory facilities are sex-segregated, which makes
classification critical for transgender persons).
302. Id. at 764–75 (discussing rules and requirements for changing gender designation on
birth certificates, drivers licenses, and passports).
303. See generally, JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011) [hereinafter INJUS-
TICE AT EVERY TURN].
304. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STU-
DENTS IN U.S. SCHOOLS, 85–93 (2001).
305. INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN, supra note 303, at 3, 50–70.
306. Id. at 4, 106–23.
307. Id. at 3, 51, 106–07.
308. Id. at 3, 51, 64–65, 72, 80–81.
309. Id. at 6, 33, 80, 100, 106, 127, 158.
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Core types of human functioning (e.g., social affiliation, bodily integ-
rity, health, control over one’s environment, relative status in social hierar-
chies) often cluster together, such that impairment of one type of
functioning can impair other types of functioning.310 Transgender persons
live in a pervasive environment of “corrosive disadvantage,”311 from which it
is difficult to escape. Given the difficulty of daily life as a transgender per-
son, perhaps it is not surprising that transgender persons have much higher
rates of attempted suicide than cisgender persons.312 Among transgender
persons, the highest attempted suicide rates are among the subset of trans-
gender persons who report that others always are able to tell that the person
is transgender.313
The need for GCS is created in part by legal rules and norms that
divide sexes into binary male/female classifications in contexts that are en-
countered in daily life. Many jurisdictions require proof of genital surgery to
change a gender classification on identification documents, e.g., birth certif-
icates.314 Gender-based legal rules and documents dictate which public
restrooms or locker rooms a person legally can use, or whom a person can
marry. Opportunities to flourish and participate in society are denied to
persons who cannot obtain legal documentation of the gender in which they
live full-time. As Anne Bloom notes,
American Law continues to enforce sex- and gender-based dis-
tinctions which are believed to be grounded in “nature” or a pre-
political biological reality. . . . [T]he law itself is playing a part in
both enforcing and generating norms of sexual identity. The
310. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 122–25 (2007) (describ-
ing empirical research on clustering of “high-weight” functionings and social deter-
minants of health).
311. Id. at 133 (explaining that “disadvantage in one [type of] functioning leads to disad-
vantages in [other types of functioning]” and describing the compound effect of
multiple forms of disadvantage as “corrosive disadvantage”).
312. TRANSGENDER SUICIDE ATTEMPTS, supra note 181, at 2.
313. Id.
314. See Spade, Documenting Gender, supra note 301, at 762, 768 (detailing the processes
by which Social Security gender reclassification, and state birth certificate gender
reclassification require proof of genital surgery). But see, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes
Rules & Regs. Title 10, § 35.2 (2014) (allowing birth certificate gender reclassifica-
tion without proof of genital surgery, and instead allowing a notarized affidavit from
a licensed medical professional stating that the applicant has been treated or evalu-
ated clinically for a gender-related condition). For a list of state law requirements for
birth certificate gender reclassification, see generally Know Your Rights, Changing Birth
Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changing-birth-certifi-
cate-sex-designations.
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emphasis on “natural” or biological sex differences in American
jurisprudence reveals an important way in which the law plays
a role in shaping what it means to be a man or a woman.
Furthermore, these cases indicate the importance of the body in
the enforcement and reproduction of legal norms.315
B. Defining “Cosmetic Surgery or Other Similar Procedures”
According to the IRS, O’Donnabhain’s hormone therapy and GCS
are “cosmetic”—not “medical care”—because she undertook the procedures
for the purpose of “transforming herself from looking like a man to looking
like a woman.”316 The IRS characterized various appearance-improving pro-
cedures undertaken by O’Donnabhain, including the facial feminization
surgery, the breast augmentation surgery, and the surgical construction of
“female looking genitalia” as “the epitome of cosmetic procedures.”317 The
IRS even argued that the vaginal dilator that O’Donnabhain was required to
use after the surgery “had a cosmetic purpose,” i.e., was intended to change
O’Donnabhain’s “appearance.”318 To the contrary, the purpose of the vagi-
nal dilator was functional—to keep O’Donnabhain’s post-operative vagina
open, not to improve her appearance.
Under the IRS’s broad interpretation of the § 213(d)(9) cosmetic sur-
gery rule, a medical procedure that changes appearance is not medical care,
even if it promotes proper functioning, unless the procedure is exactly within
the narrow example mentioned in the legislative history of the cosmetic
surgery amendment. The IRS characterized the legislative history as requir-
ing that a taxpayer prove (1) “medical necessity”319 and (2) that the expenses
were incurred for “procedures for treatment of a disfiguring condition aris-
ing from a congenital abnormality, personal injury, trauma, or disease, such
as reconstructive surgery following the removal of a malignancy.”320 The
IRS took the position that the exception in the legislative history did not
315. Anne Bloom, Rupture, Leakage, and Reconstruction: The Body as a Site for the Enforce-
ment and Reproduction of Sex-based Legal Norms in the Breast Implant Controversy, 14
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 88 (2005). See also David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex
and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002) (making similar points about invocation of
(gendered) “nature”).
316. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 139 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
319. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 26 (Hamilton opening statement on behalf of
Respondent) (“medical necessity” requires a showing that the procedure “[promotes]
the proper function of the body and which only incidentally affect the patient’s
appearance.”).
320. Id. at 26.
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apply in the O’Donnabhain case, because the procedures were undertaken
by O’Donnabhain primarily to change “her appearance from male to fe-
male”321 and did not promote the “proper function” of O’Donnabhain’s
body, which functioned normally as a male body prior to the medical
transition.322
The IRS distinguished Revenue Ruling 2003-57, in which it inter-
preted the cosmetic surgery amendment and concluded that taxpayers could
deduct the costs of “breast reconstruction after mastectomy surgery as part
of a treatment for cancer,” because breast reconstruction “ameliorated a de-
formity directly related to the taxpayer’s treatment for cancer.”323 The cost
of a medical procedure that improves appearance is deductible only if the
taxpayer has a “primarily medical purpose” in undertaking the procedure.324
The IRS argued that O’Donnabhain’s primary goal in undertaking the fem-
inizing hormone therapy and GCS was to improve her appearance; she
wished to appear more feminine so that she could “pass” as a woman and
321. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
322. Id. at 23 (Hamilton opening statement on behalf of Respondent) (noting that
O’Donnabhain had male anatomy and had fathered children). See also Respondent’s
Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 8 (referring to Stipulation Paragraph 16; Trial Tran-
script at 48). See also id., at 139 (O’Donnabhain had “functioning male anatomy”
prior to the GCS), 134 (IRS did not concede that removal of male genitalia and
construction of female genitalia “promoted the proper function of petitioner’s body
or prevented or treated illness or disease”). “Petitioner admits that her appearance as
a man had not been defective. [GCS] removed petitioner’s healthy male organs and
replaced them with structures created by a plastic surgeon to appear like female sex
organs.” Id. at 181.
323. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 151, citing and distinguishing Rev.
Rule. 2003-57, 2003-1 C.B. 959 (2003). The ruling discussed the post-1990 de-
ductibility of the costs of three medical or dental procedures that improve appear-
ance: breast reduction after mastectomy, laser eye surgery, and teeth whitening. The
IRS concluded that (1) costs for breast reconstruction after mastectomy were deduct-
ible because breast reconstruction ameliorated a cancer-related deformity; (2) costs
for laser eye surgery to treat myopia were deductible because the surgery meaning-
fully promoted the proper function of the taxpayer’s body; and (3) costs for profes-
sional teeth whitening, to reverse age-related yellowing, were not deductible because
teeth whitening is “directed at” improving appearance, not at treating disease or
promoting proper functioning of the body. Id. Note that breast reconstruction is not
required by a “disfiguring disease” so much as the disfiguring effects of medical treat-
ment for disease, typically the disfiguring effects of mastectomy undertaken to treat
breast cancer.
324. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 152. For this proposition, the IRS
cites cases and Treas. Reg. §1.213-1(e)(1)(ii), which states that § 213 medical ex-
pense deductions “will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.” Treas. Reg.
§1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
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“the purpose of the GCS was . . . to create the appearance of female
genitalia.”325
Although the IRS asserted that § 213(d)(9) limits both prongs of the
§ 213(d)(1)(A) definition of medical care, the legislative history of the cos-
metic surgery amendment suggests that the Congressional focus was on lim-
iting the “structure” part of the “structure or function prong.” The 1990
amendment reversed earlier IRS rulings that allowed deductions for face lifts
and electrolysis.326 In these rulings, the procedures were not within the “dis-
ease” prong of § 213(d)(1)(A), because they were performed on patients
who did not suffer from dysfunction, but were within the “structure or
function” prong of § 213(d)(1)(A).327
The legislative history provides no indication that Congress intended
to alter the core “functioning” concept of § 213(d)(1)(A) and deny deduc-
tions for appearance-improving procedures that reduce dysfunction.328 The
breast reconstruction surgery example in the legislative history supports this
interpretation of the cosmetic surgery limitation.329  A medical procedure
that incidentally improves a patient’s appearance and reduces dysfunction is
not “cosmetic surgery,” even if insurance companies do not regard the pro-
cedure as “medically necessary”;330 such a procedure is not within the
§ 213(d)(9) cosmetic surgery exclusion and is § 213(d)(1)(A) medical
care.331 Conversely, a “purely” cosmetic procedure, i.e., a medical procedure
that improves a patient’s appearance and does not reduce dysfunction, is
within the § 213(d)(9) cosmetic surgery exclusion and is not
§ 213(d)(1)(A) medical care.332 The example of teeth whitening, which im-
proves appearance and does not promote proper functioning, illustrates this
limitation.333
Whether a breast augmentation surgery is “cosmetic” depends on the
reason for the surgery. If a patient’s pre-surgical breasts are within a broad
325. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 180.
326. 136 CONG. REC. S30,570 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The cosmetic surgery amendment refers to “necessary” treatment as being outside
the definition of cosmetic surgery, meaning treatment that promotes the proper
function of the body. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-508, § 11342(a), 104 Stat. 1388-471 (1990) (“Denial of Deduction for Unnec-
essary Cosmetic Surgery”). The legislative history of the cosmetic surgery amend-
ment provides, as an example of “necessary” treatment, breast reconstruction
following mastectomy. Insurance companies classified such breast reconstruction sur-
gery as not “medically necessary.”
330. Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-1 C.B. 959.
331. 27 U.S.C.A. § 213(d)(1)(A) (Westlaw through P.L. 114-219), § 213(9).
332. Id.
333. Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-1 C.B. 959.
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range of “normal” (determined statistically), the breast augmentation sur-
gery is cosmetic. If, however, the patient suffers from micromastia, or is
reconstructing a breast following lumpectomy or mastectomy, the breast
augmentation is functional—not cosmetic. Similarly, whether a Botox in-
jection is a § 213(d)(9)(B) “other similar procedure” depends on whether
the injection is “purely” cosmetic or is functional, for example, to treat
chronic migraine headaches or muscle spasms.334 Even liposuction is not
“cosmetic surgery” or a “similar procedure” if the liposuction is undertaken
for a functional purpose. For example, in 2001, Tax Court Special Trial
Judge Powell held that a taxpayer could deduct the cost of three related
procedures (liposuction, excess skin removal, and fluid removal) to remove
an unwieldy “mass” that resulted from her 100-pound weight loss.335 After
reviewing the legislative history of the cosmetic surgery amendment, Judge
Powell opined: “It is clear from the Senate Finance Committee report that
Congress did not intend that the expenses of all so-called cosmetic surgeries
would be nondeductible.”336 Judge Powell held that the procedures were
medical care because the taxpayer was obese and the mass “was prone to
infection and disease and interfered with [her] daily life,” including her
work as an emergency room nurse.337 Although the procedures significantly
improved the taxpayer’s appearance, their primary purpose was to improve
the taxpayer’s functioning.338 The procedures thus were not “cosmetic” and
were within the § 213(d)(1)(A) definition of medical care.339
Contrary to the IRS’s arguments in O’Donnabhain, the goals and
methods of breast reconstruction surgery are in many ways similar to the
goals and methods of GCS. Of course, a reconstructed breast often takes the
place of a diseased breast (the malignancy on which is tangible and can be
proven scientifically), whereas genitalia constructed through GCS take the
place of “healthy” genitalia that are surgically removed. Whether that differ-
ence is relevant depends on whether one believes that GID is “real” and
334. See, e.g., BOTOX, DRUGS.COM (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) http://www.drugs.com/
mtm/botox.html (listing medical conditions for which Botox is prescribed as treat-
ment, including chronic migraine headaches, various types of muscle spasms, and
severe underarm sweating).
335. Al-Murshidi v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-185, No. 4230-00S (2001). The
case was designated as an “S” (“small”) tax case. Although small tax case opinions
have no precedential value and are not treated as “authority,” under § 7463, the case
is instructive regarding the contexts within which a procedure that might seem to be
categorically “cosmetic” is not “cosmetic” under § 213(d).
336. Al-Murshidi, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-185 at 5.
337. Al-Murshidi, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-185 at 6.
338. See Al-Murshidi, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-185 (observing that the medical proce-
dures undertaken by the taxpayer “meaningfully promoted the proper function of
her body”).
339. See Al-Murshidi, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-185.
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causes psychological suffering that is comparable to the suffering of a
woman whose breast has been removed. Transgender persons commonly
refer to their pre-GCS genitalia as deformities, even going so far as to
describe them as “life-threatening deformities.”340 Also, like GCS, breast re-
construction often involves removal of healthy tissue (e.g., removal of a non-
diseased breast, followed by reconstruction to achieve symmetry, or removal
of abdominal, buttock, or back tissue to construct a breast).341 Removal of
healthy tissue seems to be one of the chief moral objections to GCS, but no
comparable moral objection seems to have erupted in the context of breast
reconstruction symmetry surgeries or trans flap surgeries. Breast cancer pa-
tients and GID patients both keenly feel the need to function normally in
public and private spaces. For a breast cancer patient, the risks of not pass-
ing in public spaces are primarily psychological.342 For transgender persons,
the risks of not passing in public spaces are far more severe and potentially
include verbal harassment, physical assault, sexual assault, and arrest.343
C. Additional § 213 Requirements
The IRS also argued that a taxpayer cannot deduct the cost of a proce-
dure—including an inherently medical procedure—unless the taxpayer can
340. See, e.g., ORBACH, supra note 177, at 26 (trans woman “described the male genitals
she was born with as ‘an embarrassing often life-threatening birth defect’”). Breast
reconstruction following mastectomy also is characterized as “life-saving.” See 144
CONG. REC. 27,499 supra note 57.
341. See supra text at note 60 and note 62.
342. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 46, at 147–48 (describing a humiliating post-mastec-
tomy breast prosthesis incident in a public pool):
My range of motion was so limited, I couldn’t lift my arm out of the water.
It took me thirty gimpy strokes . . . drag . . . stroke . . . drag to get only
halfway across the pool and I’d swum blindly into the lane dividers multiple
times. I was out of breath, swallowing water, and embarrassing myself. I . . .
turned back, hoping to reach the edge by doing the breaststroke. That is
when I swam into a blurry mass of tawny-colored silicone, a nippleless blob
bobbing like a big cow patty in the water. My falsie. I stuffed it back into
my suit, frantically dog-paddled across two lanes to the edge, got out of the
water, and drove home soaking wet.
Id.
343. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 300. See also Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 576 (Dr.
Brown redirect) (if transsexual woman using a restroom does not pass, she “can be
arrested in many jurisdictions for using the wrong restroom [and] publicly humili-
ated.”). There is a heated debate among race, feminist, and transgender scholars
about whether transgender “passing” should be condemned in the same way that
transracial passing historically has been condemned. In the racial context, “passing”
has a negative connotation and is viewed by some as a form of “racial betrayal.” See,
e.g., Bettcher, supra note 119, at 52.
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establish that the procedure was (1) efficacious and (2) medically neces-
sary.344 The IRS asserted that a medical procedure is not efficacious if (1) it
did not, in fact, cure the taxpayer or (2) if the diagnosis or procedure is
controversial within the medical community.345 In addition, the IRS took
the position that a medical procedure does not cure the taxpayer if the med-
ical diagnosis for which the taxpayer was treated was a misdiagnosis.
To the contrary, § 213(d)(1)(A) provides that an expense is medical
care if it is “ ‘for’ treatment of a disease or ‘for’ the purpose of affecting the
structure or function of the body.”346 Consistent with this statutory lan-
guage, the § 213(d) test does not require a taxpayer to establish that the
diagnosis was correct (i.e., that no other diagnosis was plausible),347 the
medical procedure cured the taxpayer,348 or that the treatment is not contro-
versial within the medical community.349 Section 213 simply requires that
the taxpayer—ex ante, before undertaking the medical treatment—subjec-
tively and reasonably believe that the treatment will be efficacious; it does
not require a successful health outcome ex post.350 The IRS argument that
§ 213 allows deductions only for medical procedures that “cure” the tax-
payer is untenable. Such an approach would deny deductions for most med-
ical procedures to treat diseases with low survival or cure rates (e.g.,
pancreatic cancer) or progressively debilitating diseases (e.g., multiple sclero-
sis). Such an approach also ignores the dominant rationales for the medical
expense deduction: taxpayers spend money on medical procedures because
health is critical for functioning and taxpayers believe that the care will be
efficacious. Whether the care is or is not efficacious is irrelevant. Nor does
§ 213 require that IRS agents or the Office of Chief Counsel believe that
the treatment would be efficacious. A patient’s subjective and reasonable
beliefs are based on the expert recommendations of health care profession-
als. If a health care professional recommends a medical procedure to address
dysfunction and improve the patient’s internal psychological functioning
344. Respondent’s Opening Brief supra note 14, at 192 (arguing that O’Donnabhain can-
not deduct the cost of GCS because GCS “neither cures GID, nor is medically
necessary for GID, nor is medically effective treatment for GID”).
345. Respondent’s Reply Brief, supra note 188, at 47 (although the Benjamin standards of
care represent the consensus view of GID specialists, they are not “established”
“within mainstream medicine,” and “GID is not universally accepted as a
diagnosis.”).
346. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A).
347. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 51 (deduction is allowed even if the
taxpayer is misdiagnosed).
348. Id. at 71–73.
349. Id. at 41.
350. See, e.g., Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (focusing on whether a taxpayer primarily incurred an
expense for medical care based on the ex ante belief that the procedure would be
efficacious, not on the ex post outcome of the procedure).
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and social functioning, such a procedure is medical care, even if the diagno-
sis is incorrect.
Equally untenable is the IRS argument that a medical procedure is
efficacious (and therefore can be medical care) only if the procedure is not
controversial within the medical community.351 For example, the costs of a
Christian Science Practitioner are deductible as medical care despite the fact
that such treatment is at odds with standard medical practices.352 Ad-
riamycin, a drug that is used to treat breast cancer, is controversial within
the medical oncology community.353 However, if a patient’s doctor
prescribes Adriamycin, that controversy does not remove the drug from the
definition of medical care. Again, all that is required is that the taxpayer
reasonably and subjectively believe that the care will be efficacious.
Section 213 also does not require a taxpayer to establish that a medical
procedure is “medically necessary.”354 Showing that a medical procedure is
medically necessary is sufficient, although not required, to establish that the
procedure is § 213(d)(1)(A) “medical care.” A medical procedure can be
medical care even if the taxpayer cannot establish that the procedure is re-
garded by insurance plans as medically necessary. Medical necessity is a mal-
351. The IRS argued that GCS is controversial (and does not “treat” severe GID), based
on Dr. McHugh’s assertion that GCS is “collaborating with madness,” in spite of
Dr. Brown’s expert testimony that there is evidence of “quite impressive” measures
of the success of hormone treatment and GCS in treating GID. Trial Transcript,
supra note 81, at 291–92 (direct examination of Dr. Brown, indicating that compar-
isons of the success of GCS to treat GID and medical treatments for other medical
conditions such as heart disease are “substantially favorable” to GCS). Conversely, in
response to IRS questioning, Dr. Brown testified that, although clinicians repeatedly
have tried to talk patients out of their persistent gender identity, the talk therapy
approach “doesn’t work.” Id. at 387 (adding: “[I]f that worked, we’d still be doing it
today. But that doesn’t work.”). See also id. at 396. The IRS conceded the positive
results described in the famous Mate-Kole study, which concluded that patients who
received GCS “showed decreased neurotic symptoms and were more socially active”
than the control group, but asserted that patients who receive various types of elec-
tive cosmetic surgery, such as nose jobs, also are satisfied with the results. Respon-
dent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 188.
352. See Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307 (ruling that deductible medical expenses
include payments for services rendered by Christian Science practitioners).
353. Research established that the drug increases the risk of congestive heart failure. See,
e.g., Rowan T. Chlebowski, Adriamycin (Doxorubicin) Cardiotoxicity: A Review, 131
WESTERN J. MED. 364 (1979). Some oncologists discontinued use of the drug, due
to its cardiotoxicity, but other oncologists continued to administer the drug, based
on its proven track record in treating cancer. See, e.g., Dennis Slamon et al., Adjuvant
Trastuzumab in HER2-Positive Breast Cancer, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273 (2011)
(authors argue for discontinuing use of Adriamycin due to cardiotoxicity of the
drug).
354. See I.R.C. § 213.
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leable, indeterminate, context-dependent term.355 To deny insurance
coverage of a procedure, insurance companies often argue that the proce-
dure is not medically necessary.356 However, such denial of coverage for a
procedure does not establish that the procedure is not “medical.” The best
example of this is the nearly universal denial of insurance coverage for breast
reconstruction following mastectomy (prior to the enactment of breast re-
construction mandates), on the grounds that breast reconstruction is not
medically necessary. Notwithstanding insurance company consensus that
breast reconstruction surgery is not medically necessary, Congress and state
legislatures enacted breast reconstruction mandates to reverse the denial of
coverage for breast reconstruction. The 1990 legislative history of the cos-
metic surgery amendment also gives breast reconstruction surgery as an ex-
ample of appearance-improving surgery that is not cosmetic surgery—
notwithstanding the widespread insurance company classification of such
surgeries as not “medically necessary”—because breast reconstruction pro-
motes more normal functioning.
The arguments made by the IRS in O’Donnabhain are surprisingly
weak and flatly inconsistent with decades of cases and administrative pro-
nouncements, as Judge Gale’s majority opinion notes.357 A plausible expla-
nation for the puzzling IRS argument is that the IRS denied
O’Donnabhain’s deduction based on bias against transgender persons358
and agreement with Dr. McHugh’s anti-GCS arguments, including his ar-
gument that GCS is immoral.359 The IRS could not win the case by making
overt religious, moral, or ethical objections; IRS counsel instead used the
pretext of interpreting § 213 in farfetched, unprecedented ways.
D. IRS Arguments Taken as a Whole
Taken as a whole, the arguments made by the IRS are implausible. If
the IRS arguments had prevailed in the O’Donnabhain case, the decision
355. See, e.g., Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14 HEALTH AFFAIRS
180 (1995) (noting that the term “medical necessity” is ambiguous, “undefined” and
“open to interpretation,” and that insurance plans use it “as a place holder to define
the limits of their benefit coverage, despite widespread disagreement about its
meaning”).
356. See id. at 181 (“medical necessity,” “a rationing tool largely under the control of
insurance plan administrators,” is used by insurance companies to contain health
care costs, through denial of coverage for expensive treatments).
357. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 56 (“[R]espondent’s interpretation [of disease] is flatly
contradicted by nearly a half century of caselaw.”).
358. Critical tax scholars also have noted an implicit bias towards “heteronormativity” in
the tax law. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101
W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998).
359. See Psychiatric Misadventures, supra note 94, at 502.
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would have reversed settled law regarding the deductibility of many, many
types of medical expenses. The approach asserted by the IRS would: radi-
cally curtail the medical expense deduction in arbitrary ways; create massive
confusion and uncertainty about the deductibility of medical expenses in
specific cases; increase disputes and litigation regarding the definition of
medical care; render § 213 very difficult for the IRS to administer; and
deny a deduction for expenses that fit within the dominant rationales for
§ 213.
Under the IRS arguments asserted in O’Donnabhain, a taxpayer would
be able to deduct expenses for an inherently medical procedure (i.e., a proce-
dure performed by health care professionals in a health care setting—not
golf outings or resort vacations) only if the taxpayer could prove: (1) a
known internal biological (i.e., pathological) disease etiology for the “disease”
for which they received care; (2) that the procedure was not undertaken to
alter the taxpayer’s appearance (and if the procedure altered the taxpayer’s
appearance, it is presumed that the primary purpose of the procedure was to
alter appearance);360 (3) that the taxpayer’s illness, condition, or disorder is
not attributable to the taxpayer’s “behavior” or “choices”; (4) that the medi-
cal procedure in fact effected a “cure” or “treatment,” i.e., that it was “effica-
cious”; (5) that there is no “controversy” within the medical community
about the procedure; and (6) that the procedure was “medically
necessary.”361
Under this test, taxpayers could not deduct the costs of many types of
medical procedures. The etiology of many diseases, including most types of
mental illness, is unknown, and the efficacy of many standard types of med-
ical care for common diseases is indeterminate even to medical experts,
much less ordinary taxpayers who are claiming deductions for expenses they
incurred in good faith on the advice of their health care professionals.362
Scientific ignorance about the causes of diseases should not prevent taxpay-
ers who are following standard treatment protocols from deducting the costs
of medical care ordered by health care professionals to restore or simulate
normal functioning. In addition, the notion that a taxpayer can deduct the
cost of a procedure only if it cures the patient is unprecedented and incon-
sistent with § 213.
Also, the classification of many types of medical procedures would be
uncertain under the test proposed by the IRS in the O’Donnabhain case.
This became evident during the trial, when Dr. Dietz could not classify as
360. The § 213(d)(9) term “cosmetic surgery” is defined narrowly to exclude from the
definition of medical care “only expenses ‘directed at improving the patient’s appear-
ance.’” Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 72, at 41 (emphasis in original).
361. See supra Part II.D.1.b. (IRS’s arguments in the O’Donnabhain case).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 264–.
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diseases or non-diseases many common disorders or conditions about which
he was questioned.363 He further conceded that there is no medical refer-
ence text that could provide such classifications.364 If a medical expert on
disease classification is unable to classify common health disorders as dis-
eases or non-diseases, using the narrow IRS test, the IRS and taxpayers also
would be clueless about how to classify common disorders. The arbitrary
nature of some elements of the IRS test (e.g., whether there is proof of
known internal disease etiology for a particular disorder) defy simple classi-
fication rules. The new test asserted by the IRS thus is not administrable.
In addition, taxpayers and the IRS likely would disagree on the classi-
fication of various medical procedures under the new hyper-technical IRS
test, which would increase tax controversies and litigation to apply the test.
Many new issues would have to be resolved under the narrow IRS test. For
example, how would the IRS and taxpayers know whether a medical condi-
tion is a congenital defect? Would the costs of prescription growth hormone
to treat a child with idiopathic short stature (“ISS”) be deductible as medi-
cal expenses?365 Growing taller improves appearance and ISS is defined as
extreme shortness with no identifiable pathology.366 Growth hormone thus
would be “cosmetic” under the test the IRS asserted in O’Donnabhain, un-
less the IRS treated ISS as a congenital defect. A quick review of the various
types of medical expenses listed in Taxpayer Publication 502 provides the
following examples of costs that the IRS has classified as deductible but
might no longer be deductible under the arguments that the IRS made in
363. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 829–94. Dr. Dietz was questioned about classify-
ing mental disorders that are listed in the DSM. Physical conditions, injuries, and
congenital defects also might be difficult to classify under the narrow IRS test for
medical expenses. Consider for example, the classification of the costs of Lasik eye
surgery. Myopia is a condition affecting the visual system, but myopia does not have
a disease pathology or etiology, and the eye surgery alters a patient’s appearance
because the patient no longer needs to wear glasses after the surgery. The IRS none-
theless ruled, in Revenue Ruling 2003-57 (after the 1990 enactment of the
§ 213(d)(9) cosmetic surgery limitation), that the taxpayer could deduct the cost of
the eye surgery because it affected the functioning of the taxpayer’s vision. Rev. Rul.
2003-57, 2003-1 CB 959 (2003). The ruling seems inconsistent with the arguments
that the IRS made in the O’Donnabhain case.
364. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 892–93 (Dietz testimony). O’Donnabhain’s law-
yer asked Dr. Dietz whether there is “any publicly available source or text that indi-
cates, for each individual [DSM] classification, whether that particular classification
meets the definition of disease.” Id. at 893. Dr. Dietz conceded that there is not. Id.
365. See, e.g., Stefania Pedicelli et al., Controversies in the Definition and Treatment of Idio-
pathic Short Stature (ISS), 1(3) J. CLINICAL RES. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY 105
(Feb. 2009).
366. See, e.g., id. at 108 (“[S]hort stature is defined on the basis of a statistical cut-off
point [two Standard Deviations below mean height for the reference group] which
does not automatically imply the presence of an underlying pathology”).
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the O’Donnabhain case:367 inpatient treatment for drug addiction, inpatient
treatment for alcohol addiction, weight-loss program, stop-smoking pro-
gram, Christian Science practitioner, orthodontia, artificial teeth, artificial
limbs, pregnancy test kit, legal vasectomy, sterilization, birth control pills,
legal abortion, and fertility enhancement procedures.
As noted earlier, the IRS might deny deductions for expenses incurred
to treat diseases with low survival rates or progressive debilitating diseases,
and expenses incurred in clinical trials or for experimental medical treat-
ment, on the grounds that the treatment is not “efficacious.” The denial of
medical expense deductions in such cases is so antithetical to the rationales
for § 213 that the IRS approach seems absurd.
To summarize, the arguments made by the IRS in the O’Donnabhain
case are inexplicable as a matter of longstanding tax law. The IRS arguments
can be explained, however, as an attempt to deny the taxpayer’s deduction
for reasons having nothing to do with tax law—namely animus towards
transgender persons and moral outrage regarding GCS.
E. Treatment of Transgender Persons
The IRS has a continuing obligation to treat taxpayers fairly.368 Tax-
payers have a right to “quality service” from the IRS, which includes “cour-
teous [ ] and professional assistance.”369 Taxpayers also have a right to “a fair
and just tax system.”370 In addition, the IRS has a policy of not discriminat-
ing “based on race, color, national origin, reprisal, disability, age, sex (in-
cluding sexual orientation . . .), religion, or parental status.”371 The extreme
nature of some of the arguments the Office of Chief Counsel made in the
O’Donnabhain case raises concerns about discrimination against transgender
367. Pub. 502, supra note 45, at 5–8, 13–15.
368. IRS Mission Statement 2016, I.R.B. 2016-1 (Jan. 4, 2016) (“The IRS Mission: Pro-
vide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand and meet
their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.”).
369. I.R.S. News Release FS-2015-5 (2015):
In addition to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, the IRS is committed to ensuring
that your civil rights are also protected. Taxpayers are not subjected to dis-
crimination based on race, color, national origin, reprisal, disability, age, sex
(including sexual orientation and pregnancy discrimination), religion, or
parental status in programs or services conducted by the IRS or on its be-
half. If a taxpayer believes he or she has been discriminated against, a writ-
ten complaint can be emailed to edi.civil.rights.division@irs.gov or mailed
to the IRS Civil Rights Division.
Id.
370. I.R.S. Pub. 1 (2014) (Taxpayer Bill of Rights includes “The Right to a Fair and Just
Tax System”).
371. Supra note 369.
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persons, as well as concerns about the IRS making similar hyper-technical
tax arguments to covertly advance a moral agenda that the IRS cannot
achieve overtly.
Unlike some federal statutes, the Internal Revenue Code does not con-
tain any explicit statutory expression of the views that GID and transsexual-
ism are deviant sexual behavior and unethical.372 The IRS arguments in the
O’Donnabhain case nonetheless assert these views covertly, by making
hyper-technical tax arguments about “disease” and “cosmetic surgery” in an
attempt to deny O’Donnabhain a tax deduction for hormone treatment and
GCS.
During the O’Donnabhain tax controversy and litigation, the IRS and
Office of Chief Counsel showed disrespect for transgender persons, includ-
ing O’Donnabhain. The IRS briefs and arguments, for example, include
various instances of transgender stereotyping. The IRS and its expert wit-
ness, Dr. Dietz, treated O’Donnabhain like a criminal paraphiliac, lumping
372. Some conservative interest groups openly express views that echo Dr. McHugh’s
views and have successfully enlisted like-minded legislators to express some of their
views in legislation. For example, such groups and their allies in Congress strongly
opposed enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, on homophobic grounds,
and the proposed classification of GID and transsexualism as disabilities, on
transphobic grounds. See Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 33 (2004). One purpose of the
ADA was to classify HIV/AIDS as a disability (such that accommodation for the
disability would be required), leading conservative legislators to oppose the bill. Id. at
40. Representative Dan Burton argued: “The ADA is a last ditch attempt of the
remorseless sodomy lobby to achieve its national agenda before the impending deci-
mation of AIDS destroys its political clout. Their Bill simply must be stopped. There
will be no second chance for normal America if the ADA is passed.” Id. at 33.
Although these groups lost the overall ADA battle, they won the GID/transgender
battle by adding to the ADA a provision stating that the term “disability” does not
include: “transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, GID
not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders.” Id. at
35. This characterization of GID and transsexualism as deviant sexual behavior is
consistent with the views articulated by Dr. McHugh and Dr. Dietz. The statutory
grouping of GID and transsexualism with the sex crimes of pedophilia, exhibition-
ism, and voyeurism conveys moral opprobrium against GID and transsexualism. Id.
at 50 (noting that ADA transsexual exclusion language, which groups transsexual
persons with persons with “sexual behavior disorders,” is “extremely derogatory” to-
wards transsexual persons). In addition, commentators argue that the exclusion of
GID and transsexualism from the ADA definition of “disability” is unconstitutional.
Kevin M. Barry, Brian Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi, and Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire
to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 507
(2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss2/4 (asserting that “the
ADA’s transgender exclusions are unconstitutional no matter what level of scrutiny
applies because moral animus against transgender people is not a legitimate basis for
lawmaking”).
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together GID and criminal forms of sexual deviance.373 Dr. Dietz’s open
hostility towards classifying GID as a disease was grounded in his extensive
experience in criminal trials,374 where his testimony that criminal defend-
ants do not suffer from “disease” prevents them from escaping criminal re-
sponsibility for their actions. Dr. Dietz explained his reluctance to treat a
mental disorder, such as GID, as a disease:
[T]o avoid certain kinds of mischief, it’s necessary to clearly dis-
tinguish which disorders in the DSM are, in fact, diseases, [and]
which ones are not. . . .
[M]ost often, . . . the distinction that I am asked to address
is in reference to the predicate mental disease question for com-
petence issues or sanity issues.
And there, the point is to have some reference point for
ensuring that only people who have biological, pathological pro-
cess get the special consideration of freedom from responsibility.
Because otherwise, if we allow the word disease to expand
endlessly to everything in the DSM, all criminals could be said
to suffer from the predicate mental disease. . . . And we would
lose all accountability for individual human behavior.375
373. During voir dire, Judge Gale asked Dr. Dietz: “Is it fair to say that the primary thrust
of your work in the area of sexuality and gender has to do with the criminal environ-
ment and criminal culpability?” Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 819–20. Dr. Deitz
answered:
[F]ar more of my experience concerns the conditions known as paraphilias
that often come in conflict with the law.
And more of my experience is among those who already have come
in conflict with the law than those who have the same condition, but ha-
ven’t offended or haven’t been caught for offending.
Then to a lesser degree, . . . I have experience with the other range of
human sexual problems, including sexual dysfunctions and gender identity
problems and sexual orientation issues.
Id. at 820. At least half of Dr. Dietz’s work as a forensic psychiatrist pertained to
cases involving “violent behavior.” Id. at 803. Dr. Dietz had no experience evaluat-
ing or treating patients with GID. Id. at 818–19.
374. At the time Dr. Dietz testified in the O’Donnabhain case, his professional experience
included forensic psychiatric work in criminal cases involving the following high-
profile defendants: “John Hinckley, Jeffrey Dahmer, the Menendez brothers, a num-
ber of the mothers who have killed their children . . . quite a few serial killers . . . the
Unibomber case, the DC snipers, the serial shooters in Phoenix, Arizona, the shot-
gun stalker in Washington, DC.” Id. at 798.
375. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 922-24 (Dietz testimony)
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This criminal “accountability” framing by the IRS and Dr. Dietz was
wholly inappropriate in the civil context of the O’Donnabhain case, where
the issue was the income tax definition of “medical care.”
Throughout the litigation, the IRS adopted a hostile “us-versus-them”
and “ingroup-versus-outgroup” stance. Accordingly, the IRS relegated
O’Donnabhain’s therapists, doctors, and GID experts to the “them” (i.e.,
the “homo-trans” “other”) outgroup to try to impugn their credibility.376
The IRS not only doubted O’Donnabhain’s legal arguments regarding the
proper interpretation of § 213(d) but also aggressively disputed the factual
assertions made by O’Donnabhain, her therapists, her doctors, and Dr.
Brown.
The IRS characterized O’Donnabhain as deceitful, deluded, or pa-
thetic.377 In effect, the IRS asserted the anti-trans version of the “masquer-
ade hypothesis,” which posits that “the trans person who transitions from
one sex/gender to another is merely donning a mask or engaging in a pre-
tense that effectively hides what they always really were (the “true per-
son”).378 This is at the heart of the IRS argument that the feminizing
hormones and GCS changed O’Donnabhain’s “appearance” only; the IRS
assumption was that O’Donnabhain could never change from a biological
man into a “true” woman. Under this view, O’Donnabhain living as a
376. See, e.g., The Psychology of Prejudice: An Overview, UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE,
http://www.understandingprejudice.org/apa/english/page9.htm (last visited Aug. 13,
2016) (observing that “prejudice is also closely connected to the way that ingroup
and outgroup members explain each other’s behavior.”). “[P]eople often make un-
charitable attributions for the behavior of outgroup members.” Id. “[C]ausal attribu-
tions implicitly follow a ‘just world’ ideology that assumes people get what they
deserve and deserve what they get,” denying the role of situational factors and “the
problem of social injustice.” Id. Also, people often “attribute behavior to disposi-
tional causes [e]ven when behaviors are undeniably caused by situational factors.” Id.
In addition, people often segment the world into ingroups and outgroups and “(1)
attribute negative outgroup behavior to dispositional causes (more than they would
for identical ingroup behavior), and (2) attribute positive outgroup behavior to one
or more of the following causes: (a) a fluke or exceptional case, (b) luck or special
advantage, (c) high motivation and effort, and (d) situational factors.” Id. This
worldview perpetuates prejudice against outgroups, “because their positive actions
are explained away while their failures and shortcomings are used against them.” Id.
377. Trans people are stereotypically depicted by the media as “sexually predatory deceiv-
ers,” deluded, or “pathetic, laughable fakes.” See Bettcher, supra note 119, at 52–53,
64–68 (“[T]rans people are inevitably constructed as frauds or fakes” and their “trans
self-identities are invalidated”).
378. Id. at 52–55 (describing two versions of the masquerade hypothesis, both of which
assume that medical transition does not change a trans person’s “true” sex/gender).
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woman is either deceitful or deluded.379 O’Donnabhain argued the inverse
version of the masquerade hypothesis: that she was always a woman on the
inside, wearing the false mask of a man, until her medical transition allowed
her to remove the mask and reveal her true self.380
The O’Donnabhain case illustrates various listening stances that can be
taken toward a taxpayer-patient’s story. A listener’s listening stance can be
represented on a spectrum, ranging from pure belief to pure doubt.381 The
clinicians (GID experts) who treated O’Donnabhain adopted a sympathetic
“believing” stance that validated her story of lifelong psychological distress
and suffering. The IRS, which adopted a “doubting” stance, was deeply
skeptical (one might go so far as to say openly contemptuous) of (1)
O’Donnabhain’s story of lifelong distress and suffering from GID; (2) the
medical clinicians who approved O’Donnabhain for GCS; (3)
O’Donnabhain’s expert witness; and (4) the medical experts who drafted
the GID section of DSM-IV-TR and the Benjamin standards of care.382 In
addition, the IRS attacked the credibility of O’Donnabhain’s therapist and
doctors because they did not adopt a doubting stance towards their patient;
the IRS argued that they should have spoken to third parties to indepen-
dently corroborate her assertions, which the IRS disputed, about the emo-
tional distress she felt. This attack on medical professionals who are
sympathetic to the stories of transgender persons is extreme. It is difficult to
imagine that the IRS would criticize medical professionals for believing their
patients’ claims of emotional distress in other medical contexts. The IRS
379. Id. at 52–53 (“trans person who transitions from one sex/gender to another is [as-
sumed to be] merely donning a mask or engaging in a pretense that effectively hides
what they always really were . . . [and] is represented as either deceptive or deluded”).
380. Id. at 53 (“trans person who transitions is merely becoming what they always already
were, through pulling off a kind of bodily mask which fails to express what that are
‘on the inside’. . .”).
381. See, e.g., JEAN KOH PETERS & MARK WEISBERG, A TEACHER’S REFLECTION BOOK:
EXERCISES, STORIES, INVITATIONS 70–74 (2011) (distinguishing between listening
with a “believing” stance and listening with a “doubting” stance, and exploring the
psychological and emotional effects of such listening stances on speakers). See also
MARY ROSE O’REILLY, RADICAL PRESENCE: TEACHING AS CONTEMPLATIVE PRAC-
TICE 22–29 (1998) (adding a third, “neutral” listening stance, which she dubs “lis-
tening like a cow,” and exploring the psychological and emotional effect of this
neutral listening stance on a speaker).
382. Judge Gale, the trial court judge and majority opinion author, adopted a neutral
listening stance. He was willing to defer to medical experts, especially GID special-
ists. The Tax Court dissenters adopted a “doubting” listening stance, were not will-
ing to defer to medical experts, and concluded that GCS affects the body but does
not treat the mental condition of GID. They observed that GCS is regarded by
many as unethical, but noted that medical expenses, such as abortion expenses, are
classified as medical expenses notwithstanding the fact that many people believe that
abortions are unethical.
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also impugned Coleman’s medical assessment of O’Donnabain specifically
because Coleman is a trans man.
The IRS also was dismissive of the narratives of transgender persons
and reduced their stories to a desire for sexual gratification. The IRS argued
that GID is not a disease because it was added to the DSM based on “narra-
tive histories given by patients” rather than scientific basis.383 To the con-
trary, Jay Prosser argues that narratives are “central” to transsexuals’
experiences and “involve the notion of home and belonging.”384 “Transsex-
ual narratives are driven by a sense of feeling not at home in one’s body,
through a journey of surgical change, ultimately coming home to oneself
(and one’s body).”385 The IRS also argued that trans women, including
O’Donnabhain, may be motivated solely by erotic desire and have transves-
tic fetishism or autogynephilia rather than GID.386 This argument is consis-
tent with a stereotypic “long standing tendency to construe transsexuality in
terms of sexual desire, to reduce cross-gender identification to a kind of
sexual fetish.”387 Taking another cue from Dr. McHugh’s writings, which
pair GCS and limb amputations for sexual gratification, the IRS questioned
Dr. Brown about the similarities between GID and apotemnophilia (body
integrity identity disorder), a disorder characterized by sexual arousal from
amputations and the desire to have one’s limbs amputated.388
Moral outrage towards transsexualism and GCS also are evident in the
IRS and Chief Counsel documents in the O’Donnabhain case, beginning
with the CCA memo and continuing throughout the case in the Tax Court.
For example, the IRS argued that GID is deviant sexual behavior, not a
“disease.”389 Additionally, the IRS argued that GCS does not treat GID,
which is consistent with Dr. McHugh’s moral view that the “natural”
human body (and “healthy” tissue) should not be surgically mutilated and
that GCS is an “abomination.”390 As commentators have noted, however,
383. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 169–70.
384. E.g., Bettcher, supra note 119, at 42–43 (summarizing Jay Prosser’s view that retro-
spective “autobiographical narrative[s] [are] essential to understanding transsexual
subjectivity” and “such narratives involve the notion of home and belonging”).
385. Id.
386. Respondent’s Opening Brief, supra note 14, at 27–28 (arguing that “[r]ather than
GID, petitioner may have suffered from transvestic fetishism” and autogynephilia,
which is “a biological man’s tendency to be sexually aroused by the thought or image
of himself as a woman,” and which “may link transvestic fetishism with non-homo-
sexual forms of GID”).
387. Bettcher, supra note 119, at 57 (citation omitted).
388. See Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 409–11 (cross examination of Dr. Brown).
389. See supra note 248.
390. See McHugh, Surgical Sex, supra note 11, at 7–9. Dr. McHugh vehemently disagrees
with those who persist in approving of GCS and criticizes what he claims is their
“deep prejudice in favor of the idea that nature is totally malleable.” Id. at 8. He also
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there is no purely “natural” body because bodies express cultural and relig-
ious norms.391  For example, in our time and culture, the removal of a breast
cancer patient’s healthy breast to construct a pair of symmetrical post-mas-
tectomy breasts is treated as “normal,” and insurers’ attempted classification
of such procedures as “cosmetic surgery” is treated as outrageous.392 Yet at
the same time, anti-GCS groups and their allies characterize GCS as unnat-
ural self-mutilation and rhetorically pair it with amputation of limbs for
sexual gratification.
Compare the costs of GCS for a taxpayer diagnosed with GID and the
costs of breast reconstruction surgery following mastectomy. Agencies, legis-
lators, and courts take a strong believing stance regarding the sad stories of
breast cancer patients and their need for medical intervention to reconstruct
their bodies.393 With respect to GID and GCS, however, agencies, legisla-
tors, and courts are more likely to take a doubting stance.394 How do we
distinguish between these types of medical procedures? Both types of pa-
tients experience the internal psychological need to be whole and to be inte-
grated psychologically. Both types of patients feel the need to fully function
in public spaces and in private.
The dominant policy rationale for § 213 assumes that all medical care
is involuntary395 (regardless of whether the procedure is elective396). Taxpay-
ers who incur catastrophic medical expenses are sympathetic, and sad narra-
tives elicit even more sympathy towards those who have suffered. George
Loewenstein, Deborah Small, and Jeff Strnad argue that, as a normative
laments that “[w]ithout any fixed position on what is given in human nature, any
manipulation of it can be defended as legitimate” by those who want GCS and think
that they should get whatever they want. Id. See also Kass-McHugh Letters, supra
note 106 (discussing the medicalization of mental disorders and the ethical issues
that arise from such medicalization).
391. ORBACH, supra note 177, at 9.
[B]odies have always been an expression of a specific period, geography,
sexual, religious, and cultural place . . . . [O]ur taken-for-granted body is
neither natural nor pure but a body that is inscribed and formed by the
accretion of myriad small specific cultural practices. . . . [T]here never has
been an altogether simple, “natural” body. There has only been a body that
is shaped by its social and cultural designation.
Id. at 8–9.
392. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12825 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen.
D’Amato) (describing as “absolutely unacceptable,” “wrong” and “outrageous” an
insurer’s denial of coverage for breast reconstruction surgery on the grounds that the
procedure was “cosmetic surgery” and not “medically necessary”).
393. See supra notes 55–62.
394. See, e.g., supra note 381.
395. See Kelman, supra note 24, at 865.
396. Pratt, Magdalin, supra note 26, at 1293–94.
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matter, we tend to under-respond to impersonal information about human
suffering; our outsized emotional reactions to the suffering of identifiable
victims may “restore our ‘true’ morality, as it would function in small
group, face-to-face settings.”397 This may explain why many of the breast
reconstruction statutes are named for identifiable victims, i.e., for specific
women who desperately wanted such breast reconstruction surgery, but
were denied insurance coverage for the procedure.398 Most religious leaders,
legislators, and lay persons know women who have battled breast cancer,
making it easy for them to imagine the plight of a woman for whom breast
reconstruction feels necessary. However, most do not know transgender per-
sons, making it difficult for them to imagine the plight of a transgender
person for whom medical transition feels equally necessary.399
A broader rationale for § 213 is that tax law should promote well-
being.400 Being heard and treated with dignity are central to well-being.
Does the O’Donnabhain decision promote or undermine the dignity of
transgender persons? The result in the case supports access to medical care
and deductibility of the medical costs of transition.401 Medical transition
makes it more likely that a patient presenting in the perceived gender can
function normally in life without being dehumanized or attacked. “Passing”
in the perceived gender, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of
transphobic violence, generally is one of the goals of medical transition.”402
Having a goal of “passing” is controversial, however. Race, feminist,
and transgender scholars debate whether transgender “passing” should be
condemned in the same way that transracial passing historically has been
397. Identifiable Victims, supra note 27 (summarizing and commenting on research that
demonstrates the identifiable victim effect).
398. See, e.g., Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 1185b
(2015), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-52 (2015) (“Janet’s Law”); ALA. CODE § 22-6-10 (2016)
(“Vanessa’s Law”).
399. See, e.g., GLAAD’s Transgender Media Program, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/
transgender (last visited July 14, 2016) (according to a recent poll, only 16% of
Americans personally know someone who is transgender); One-in-Four Have Lost
Someone To Breast Cancer, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Oct. 21, 2015), http://
www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/october_2015/
one_in_four_have_lost_someone_to_breast_cancer.
400. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Should “Tax Norms” Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax
Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WISC. L. REV.
1115, 1118, 1121-22 (1993) (arguing that tax law should adopt normative criteria
that (1) consider the consequences of specific tax policies and (2) attempt to maxi-
mize either (a) overall societal well-being, under a utilitarian ethic, or (b) the well-
being of the least well-off persons in society, under a Rawlsian leximin ethic).
401. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34.
402. Bettcher, supra note 119, at 50–52 (discussing conflicting views of various scholars).
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condemned.403 Some writers oppose GCS on the grounds that transgender
persons should not alter their bodies to conform to rigid societal gender
roles. Nuridden Knight compares a woman who wants to become a man to
Pecola, a character in a Toni Morrison novel, who is black but wants blue
eyes so desperately that she loses her mind.404 Knight argues that freedom to
alter the body creates its own form of slavery and wanting to change our
physical bodies is an act of self-hatred:405
Paradoxically, the more our society tries to free itself from gender
stereotypes, the more it becomes enslaved to them. By saying
that people can be born in a body of the wrong gender, trans-
gender activists are saying there is a set of feelings that are only
allocated to women and another set for men. Therefore, they
believe, those who feel things that do not conform to their sex’s
acceptable set of feelings must outwardly change their gender to
match their mind.
Why are we colluding with narrow ideas of femininity or
masculinity? What does it mean to “feel” like a woman? Should
we question that idea as much as we have questioned ideas of a
403. See id. In the racial context, “passing” has a negative connotation and is viewed by
some as a form of “racial betrayal.” Janice Raymond famously asked whether a black
person should be diagnosed with the disease of being “transracial” if she wants to be
white. She observed that blacks do not seek racial transition because they are aware
that the problem of racism is societal, and she condemned transsexual medical transi-
tion as surgical sex-role oppression. Id. Numerous scholars have responded to Ray-
mond’s transracial rhetorical argument. Talia Bettcher notes that “transsexualism” is
not generally viewed as an act of betrayal. Id. She observes that race is a designation
of heredity and group identity, whereas sex is a designation of individual identity;
this difference may explain the greater acceptance of transgender passing. She also
disputes Raymond’s claim that blacks do not seek racial transition. Purveyors of
cosmetic procedures that make persons of color appear white deflect negative racial
overtones, however, “by emphasizing individual self-expression and aesthetics.” Id. at
52. Procedures that alter racial features, such as hair straightening and nose jobs, thus
are characterized as promoting aesthetic values, instead of passing. Id. Christine
Overall inverts Raymond’s argument and argues that “those who accept the morality
of transsexuality ought to accept the morality of ‘transracialism.’” Id. at 51 (placing
Overall’s arguments within the broader context of the development of feminist theo-
ries about transsexuality). Cressida Heyes notes similarities and dissimilarities be-
tween racial passing and transgender passing and argues that “changing sex is
exceptional.” See, e.g., Cressida J. Heyes, Changing Race, Changing Sex: The Ethics of
Self-Transformation, in “YOU’VE CHANGED:” SEX REASSIGNMENT AND PERSONAL
IDENTITY 135, 136 (Laurie J. Shrage ed., 2009) (emphasis in original).
404. Nuriddeen Knight, An African-American Woman Reflects on the Transgender Move-
ment, PUB. DISCOURSE, June 4, 2015, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/06/
15108/ (referring to Toni Morrison’s book THE BLUEST EYE).
405. Id.
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“woman’s place” or a “man’s role”? When did we come to accept
the idea of “gendered thoughts” or “gendered feelings”? . . .
I hope we can one day find a more holistic, less invasive
means to treat this disorder.406
By treating GID as pathological, transgender persons gain access to medical
transition. Some transgender activists argue that completely eliminating the
DSM code for GID (or Gender Dysphoria, the diagnosis that recently re-
placed GID in the DSM-5407) would better promote the dignity and auton-
omy of transgender persons.408 In their view, the medicalization of
transsexuality perpetuates binary patriarchal gender.409 Although some
transgender persons feel at home in one of the two binary genders, some
transgender persons feel more at home in the “in-between space between
man and woman.”410
Judith Butler observes that those who want to keep the medical diag-
nosis and those who want to eliminate it have different conceptions of
autonomy:
Those who want to keep the diagnosis want to do so because it
helps them achieve their aims and, in that sense, realize their
autonomies. And those who want to do away with the diagnosis
want to do so because it might make for a world in which they
might be regarded and treated in nonpathological ways, there-
fore enhancing their autonomies in important ways.411
406. Id.
407. DSM-5 FACT SHEET, supra note 80.
408. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274, 275
(Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, & Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006) (“[S]ome
activist psychiatrists and transgender people have argued that the [GID] diagnosis
should be eliminated altogether, that transsexuality is not a disorder, and ought not
to be conceived of as one, and that trans people ought to be understood as engaged
in a practice of self-determination, an exercise of autonomy.”) [hereinafter Un-
diagnosing Gender].
409. Bettcher, supra note 119, at 59 (noting that Emi Koyama recognizes that trans
women may want to “pass” as non-trans women to reduce the risk of becoming a
victim of “transphobic violence”). Having a goal of “passing” can be controversial,
however. Id.
410. Id. at 43 (describing Jay Prosser’s argument that transgender “narrative involves mak-
ing a home of the in-between space between man and woman”). Bettcher counters
that “beyond-the-binary” transgender theory “tend[s] to marginalize trans people
who situate themselves within the binary, and therefore fails as a complete account
of trans oppression and resistance. Id. at 63. She frames trans oppression as
transphobia, in the form of “reality enforcement” and “identity invalidation.” Id. at
64.
411. Undiagnosing Gender, supra note 408, at 276.
384 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 23:313
Both groups seek to promote the dignity and autonomy of transgender per-
sons, but they differ in their views about how to promote them.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TAX CLASSIFICATION OF
SERVICES AND GOODS AS MEDICAL CARE
A. Interpretation of the § 213(d) Definition of Medical Care
Section A of this section summarizes various points discussed through-
out this Article regarding the interpretation of the § 213(d) definition of
“medical care.” Decades of cases and administrative practice distinguish be-
tween expenses incurred (1) for inherently medical services or goods and (2)
for goods or services that are not inherently medical. Inherently medical
services or goods include hospital services, doctors’ services, diagnostic pro-
cedures, surgical procedures, anesthesia, and prescription drugs. Services or
goods that are not inherently medical are typically purchased for personal
consumption reasons and include items such as vacations, travel to warmer
or drier climates, swimming pools, gym memberships, golf, and lawn care.
The costs of inherently medical services or goods are “medical care”
unless the “cosmetic surgery” exception applies. If the services or goods im-
prove the taxpayer-patient’s appearance, the IRS and courts must determine
whether the services or goods are “purely” cosmetic or were undertaken for
the purpose of improving dysfunction. Judge Halpern’s concurring opinion
in O’Donnabhain correctly interprets § 213(d)(9) to classify a medical pro-
cedure as “cosmetic” only if it (1) “is directed at improving appearance,” (2)
“does not prevent or treat illness or disease,” and (3) “does not meaningfully
promote the proper function of the body.”412 The focus of the inquiry is on
restoring or approximating “normal” functioning, which includes internal
biological functioning, sexual functioning, psychological functioning, and
social functioning. Medical services or goods that reduce dysfunction are
“necessary” (not purely cosmetic), but § 213 does not require a taxpayer to
establish that the services or goods are a “medical necessity,” as that term of
art is defined in insurance contracts in the context of determining insurance
coverage.413 Based on the majority’s factual conclusion that O’Donnabhain
established the medical necessity of GCS in the case, Judge Gale’s majority
opinion in O’Donnabhain deflected the question of whether “medical neces-
412. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34, 83–84 (2010) (Halpern, J., concurring).
413. See, e.g., Bergthold, supra note 355, at 183 (providing as an example the definition of
“medical necessity” in 1995 Blue Cross insurance contracts, which Blue Cross used
to determine which services were excluded from coverage). Bergthold notes that
“[p]rivate plans defined coverage mainly by long lists of specific exclusions, some of
which were longer than the list of covered services.” Id.
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sity” is a requirement under § 213.414 The question of whether a medical
procedure is “necessary” was relevant in O’Donnabhain only for the purpose
of interpreting the § 213(d)(9) cosmetic surgery rule and distinguishing be-
tween (1) “purely” cosmetic procedures, which improve appearance and do
not improve dysfunction, and (2) “necessary” cosmetic procedures, which
improve appearance and improve dysfunction.415 The legislative history of the
1990 cosmetic surgery amendment illustrates this distinction with the ex-
ample of post-mastectomy breast reconstruction, which is “necessary” not-
withstanding that (1) it improves the patient’s appearance and (2) insurance
companies denied insurance coverage of breast reconstruction as not “medi-
cally necessary.”
The costs of services or goods that are not “inherently medical” are
“medical care” only if the taxpayer can establish that the expenses satisfy the
test articulated in the Havey case.416 The point of the inquiry is to distin-
guish between nondeductible personal consumption expenses and deducti-
ble expenses that are incurred primarily for medical reasons. As the Havey
court noted, the inquiry might include the following questions about the
“origin” of a disputed expense, to discern a taxpayer’s ex ante motivation in
incurring the expense:417
[1] Was it incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician;
[2] did the treatment bear directly on the physical condition in
question; [3] did the treatment bear such a direct or proximate
therapeutic relation to the bodily condition as to justify a reason-
able belief the same would be efficacious; [4] was the treatment
so proximate in time to the onset or recurrence of the disease or
condition as to make one the true occasion of the other, thus
eliminating expense incurred for general, as contrasted with
some specific, physical improvement?418
Although a taxpayer must establish that the taxpayer incurred the ex-
pense, ex ante, primarily for a medical purpose, taxpayers do not have to
establish, ex post, the “efficacy” of the services or goods. The taxpayer does
not have to prove: (1) the services or goods in fact cured the taxpayer in the
414. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 74–76 (deferring to the WPATH standards of care re-
garding GCS). Judge Holmes criticized the majority’s factual finding of “medical
necessity” in O’Donnabhain, based on his concern that the majority’s finding may
have far-reaching implications beyond the tax law. Id. at 92–96.
415. See O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34.
416. See Havey, 12 T.C. 409.
417. Havey, 12 T.C. at 412.
418. Havey, 12 T.C. at 412.
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particular case; (2) the services or goods are not “controversial”; or (3) the
medical diagnosis was correct. Furthermore, a deduction for medical care
that is legal cannot be denied based on ethical objections to the care.419
B. Implications for Classifying the Costs of Medical Transition
If a taxpayer follows the Benjamin standards of care and has been
diagnosed with GID (or Gender Dysphoria, the diagnosis that recently re-
placed GID in the DSM-5420), the taxpayer’s costs of hormone therapy and
genital surgery are “medical care,” under the majority decision in the
O’Donnabhain case. The classification of “top surgeries,” including breast
augmentation for male-to-female transsexuals and double mastectomy for
female-to-male transsexuals, is unclear and may depend on the facts of the
case. Although the Tax Court held that O’Donnabhain’s breast augmenta-
tion surgery was not medical care, its conclusion was based in part on the
fact that O’Donnabhain had developed “B” cup breasts from the hormone
therapy, prior to the breast surgery. A taxpayer who is transitioning from
male to female and does not develop breasts from hormone therapy might
be able to argue that the breast surgery is an integral part of the medical
transition.421 Even if the taxpayer’s breast development is adequate, a tax-
payer may be able to argue that chest/breast surgery is necessary to make the
taxpayer’s chest appear more female, depending on the medical record in
the case.422
For taxpayers who are medically transitioning from female to male,
double mastectomy is more common than genital surgery.423 The Tax
419. As Judge Gustafson correctly stated in his O’Donnabhain opinion, “neither the tax
collector nor the Tax Court passes judgment on the ethics of legal medical proce-
dures, since otherwise deductible medical expenses are not rendered non-deductible
on ethical grounds.” 134 T.C. at 110 (citation omitted) (noting, as an example, that
the cost of a legal abortion is deductible).
420. DSM-5 FACT SHEET, supra note 80.
421. Judge Gale notes that the WPATH standards of care provide for breast augmentation
surgery where there is medical documentation that breast development after 18
months of hormone treatment “is not sufficient for comfort in the social gender
role.” O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 72.
422. Dr. Meltzer, O’Donnabbhain’s surgeon, testified that the bilateral breast surgery not
only increased the size of O’Donnabhain’s breasts, but also made her “male appear-
ing chest with a small amount of breast tissue on it” look more like a woman’s chest
and breasts. Trial Transcript, supra note 81, at 622–24. The majority opinion dis-
counted this testimony, however, because Dr. Meltzer’s presurgical notes stated that
O’Donnabhain’s pre-surgical B-cup breasts had a “very nice shape.” O’Donnabhain,
134 T.C. at 72–73.
423. Bettcher, supra note 119, at 45 (although discussion of GCS tends to focus on geni-
tal surgery and male-to-female transition, top surgery “often figures more promi-
nently in ftm contexts”).
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Court’s distinction between top surgery and genital surgery in the
O’Donnabhain case probably would not preclude classification of the costs
of such mastectomies as medical care, in the case of FTM transsexual tax-
payers. Judge Gale’s opinion indicates that transsexual taxpayers can deduct
the costs of surgeries that serve a therapeutic purpose and are consistent
with the WPATH standards of care.424 Such surgeries, which are not limited
to genital surgeries, include “top” surgeries and facial feminization surgeries.
In dictum, Judge Gale states that the costs of facial feminization surgery
could be deductible under this test.425 The same would be true for therapeu-
tic “top” surgeries.
The Benjamin standards of care require a medical diagnosis (GID in
DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR or Gender Dysphoria in DSM-5) to authorize
hormones and surgical transition.426 If the Gender Dysphoria diagnosis and
the DSM code for it were eliminated in the future, would a taxpayer’s costs
for hormone therapy, genital surgery, and other medical transition proce-
dures constitute “medical care”? Gender Dysphoria would no longer be clas-
sified as a disease. Taxpayers incurring costs for medical transition still could
argue that medical transition changes the structure or function of the body
and is not cosmetic surgery because transition is functional, i.e., it promotes
psychological and social functioning. The argument would be that medical
transition is as critical for some transsexual persons as breast reconstruction
surgery is for some breast cancer patients.427
C. Implications for Classifying Other Medical Procedures
In the future, the IRS could try to use technical tax arguments like the
“medical care” arguments it made in O’Donnabhain to further a moral
424. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at n. 52.
425. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at n. 52.
426. DSM-5 FACT SHEET, supra note 80. The DSM-5 substitution of Gender Dysphoria
for GID represented a compromise between transgender activists who advocated for
eliminating the GID diagnosis and transgender activists who favored keeping it. See,
e.g., Bettcher, supra note 119, at 34 (discussing tension between activists who oppose
the GID diagnosis and activists who favor it). Those who advocate for keeping the
GID diagnosis justified it as a means of providing access to medical technology and
funding for medical transition. Those who oppose the GID diagnosis argued that it
is “pathologizing and paternalistic.” Id. The new Gender Dysphoria diagnosis was
thought to reduce stigma associated with the GID diagnosis. DSM-5 FACT SHEET,
supra note 80.
427. Bettcher, supra note 119 (describing views of Christine Overall, who favors the view
that medical transition is similar to “ ‘other life-changing and life-enhancing aspira-
tions for personal transformation and self-realization’”). Overall rejects both versions
of the masquerade hypothesis, which assumes that gender is fixed and medical transi-
tion does not change it. Id.
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agenda that it cannot assert overtly. The medical context in which this
seems most likely to occur is reproductive care. Many of the arguments that
the IRS made in O’Donnabhain could be redeployed to oppose medical
expense deductions for the costs of legal fertility treatment or legal abor-
tions. For example, the IRS might argue that fertility treatment costs are not
medical care because the procedures may increase the risk of cancer428 and
thus are controversial in the medical community. As explained earlier, con-
troversy does not make otherwise deductible medical expenses non-deducti-
ble, but that did not prevent the Office of Chief Counsel from trying to
stop O’Donnabhain from deducting the costs of medical transition.
CONCLUSION
Case law and Treasury regulations indicate that normal functioning is
the baseline for determining whether medical expenses are for tax-favored
“medical care.”429 Functioning includes internal biological functioning, psy-
chological functioning, and social functioning—and is based in part on the
social and legal environment in which the individual lives.
The arguments made by the IRS in the O’Donnabhain case are puz-
zling from a tax perspective. Viewed through the lens of Dr. McHugh’s
characterizations of patients with GID (as delusional and choosing deviant
sexual behavior) and his moral objections to GCS (as an “abomination”),
they make perfect sense, however. The tax law arguments thus were “a mask
for the politics of disgust.”430 A majority of the Tax Court saw the “tax”
arguments for what they were and rightly rejected them.
The question is: why did the IRS persist in such a weak case?  Perhaps
the motivation was moral outrage, which is immune to reason. Addition-
ally, opponents of GCS perhaps saw the O’Donnabhain case as a skirmish in
a larger war being waged by the “trans-homo movement” to obtain govern-
ment funding for GCS. Dr. McHugh, his prote´ge´s, and his allies in the IRS
and Office of Chief Counsel would not concede that battle, although they
now seem to be losing the GCS funding war.431
428. See, e.g., Pratt, Inconceivable, supra note 23, at 1182–84 (describing research on po-
tential link between fertility treatment and increased risk of reproductive cancers).
429. See supra, Part II.D.2.
430. NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 26 (arguing that anti-LGBT arguments “are too flimsy
to do much work without disgust as a backdrop, or are merely a mask for the politics
of disgust”).
431. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS
BOARD (DAB), APP. DIVISION, DOCKET NO. A-13-87, DECISION NO. 2576 (May
30, 2014) (invalidating NCD 140.3, which had denied Medicare coverage of GCS
to treat GID), http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2576.pdf (last
visited March 20, 2016).
2016] TAX  D E F I N I T I O N  O F  “ M E D I C A L  C A R E ” 389
Going forward, the IRS should follow its Mission Statement,432 the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights,433 and the IRS’s nondiscrimination policy,434 by
promoting fairness in tax administration towards all taxpayers—regardless
of sex, gender, or gender identity and expression. In addition, Congress or
the IRS should add “gender (including gender identity and expression)” to
the IRS nondiscrimination policy to expressly prohibit discrimination
against transgender taxpayers and other gender nonconforming taxpayers.
More broadly, the IRS should resist making covert moral arguments in the
guise of technical arguments that are untenable from a tax perspective.435
Furthermore, Congress and state legislatures should enact legislation
to protect the civil rights of transgender persons and discourage discrimina-
tion and violence against transgender persons in housing, employment, and
public accommodations. Changing gender identification on identity docu-
ments could be based on proof of the gender in which a person lives, with-
out any legal requirement of genital surgery.436 Medical transition should
not be a requirement for a person to live within the law and avoid detention
or arrest, and society should accept greater gender variation. In a more toler-
ant environment, the need to medically transition would focus more on
relieving gender-related internal psychological distress and less on “passing”
to avoid transphobic discrimination and violence. Ultimately, these changes
would promote the dignity, autonomy, and functioning of all transgender
persons, whether they medically transition or not.
432. IRS Mission Statement 2016, I.R.B. 2016-1, Jan. 4, 2016 (“The IRS Mission: Pro-
vide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand and meet
their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.”).
433. I.R.S. Pub. 1 (2014) (Taxpayer Bill of Rights includes “The Right to a Fair and Just
Tax System”).
434. See I.R.S. News Release FS-2015-5 (2015) (Taxpayer Bill of Rights includes “The
Right to Quality Service”).
435. The contexts within which the IRS might make such covert moral arguments in-
clude cases involving tax deductions for: gender confirmation medical costs other
than hormone therapy and GCS, such as breast augmentation surgery or mastec-
tomy; and reproductive health care costs, such as the costs of contraceptives, vasec-
tomy, tubal ligation, and legal abortion, as well as the costs of fertility treatment,
including egg donor, IVF, and surrogacy.
436. See, e.g., Spade, supra note 301, at 802 (observing that a “proposal to reduce medical
evidentiary requirements in gender reclassification policies in favor of self-identity
and/or to create a standard policy nationally would do a great deal to eliminate some
of the worst consequences of the incoherence of the current policy matrix,” but
ultimately advocating for a more fundamental shift away from gender
documentation).
